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Beginning in 1999, the Army pursued a transformation effort that would span over a 
decade and produce a changed force structure that relied upon the brigade combat team as 
the service’s focal conventional fighting force. Two decisions loomed large in the 
Army’s direction away from the division as its combat force building block. This thesis 
examines both the decision to create the Stryker Brigade Combat Team as part of General 
Eric Shinseki’s vision for Army transformation, and General Peter Schoomaker’s 
decision in 2003 to focus change on the creation of a modular force. These decisions are 
investigated through three hypotheses that are based in military innovation theory. The 
hypotheses contend that the Army’s decisions can be explained by either change in the 
security environment, by intervention on the behalf of civilian leaders external to the 
service demanding change, or by innovative thinking and leadership by the Army’s 
senior uniformed or civilian leaders. This thesis finds that elements of each hypothesis 
were present in each decision, but that the impact of the security environment appeared as 
a strong causal factor in the Army’s movement toward modularization throughout the 
examination of the entire time period. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception, the United States Army (hereby known as U.S. Army, or 
Army) has experienced many changes to doctrine, technology and force structure.  
However, one constant feature of the post-World War II Army was that the combat 
division remained the focal unit within the force structure until the early 21st century. 
This thesis seeks to determine the cause of transformation that resulted in an Army that 
no longer relied upon large divisions, to a force that centered on modular brigade combat 
teams (BCT). Although the initial stages of transformation may be rooted in General Eric 
Shinseki’s peacetime decision to create the Interim Brigade Combat Team (later re-
designated the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, or SBCT), directing a complex 
organization that is steeply entrenched in service traditions toward the modular BCT 
concept while engaged in conflict only makes the question that more interesting. 
A. IMPORTANCE  
Military organizations are generally regarded as being resistant to change, 
especially if such a change involves significant innovation.1 Yet, military organizations 
have changed, and can be expected to continue to do so in the future. Although it is 
beneficial to understand how the end result of change and innovation impact an 
organization’s ability to accomplish its goals, the issue of greater importance may be 
rooted in the understanding of why an organization decides to change in the first place. 
This is especially true for a large bureaucracy such as the Army that may be not only hard 
to change, but also may be “designed not to change.”2   
Much of the research and literature regarding change and innovation tends to 
hypothesize through the delineation of peace and war, as well as through the influence of 
intra-state bureaucratic processes or the impact of factors external to the state. The case 
of recent U.S. Army transformation is unique because it spans through both peace and 
war. Further, the move to modularization occurred during two different presidential 
                                                 
1 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 2. 
2 Ibid. 
 2 
administrations, and under the leadership of two defense secretaries.3 In searching for the 
answers to determine the cause of Army transformation toward a modular BCT-centric 
force, a number of significant elements will be explored. Chief among these are the 
importance of civil-military relations and the influence of the strategic security 
environment on civilian and military leaders. While this thesis will not predict when the 
next change or innovation can be expected to occur, it strives to understand the drivers of 
change and how military leaders can foresee the need to innovate due to the number of 
factors that pressure the organization.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Academic literature concerned with military innovation offers diverse 
explanations regarding both the need for, and the sources of, change. This literature 
review will examine seven works that offer theories and examples of innovation since the 
early 20th century. Three works: Deborah D. Avant’s, Political Institutions and Military 
Change, Barry R. Posen’s, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and 
Germany Between the World Wars, and Stephen Peter Rosen’s, Winning the Next War 
consist of the core that looks to provide military innovation theory. Brian McAllister 
Linn’s, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, and Military Innovation in the 
Interwar Period, edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, build upon the core 
works and reinforce existing ideas or offer new thoughts that are relevant to the study at 
hand. Finally, James A. Russell’s, Innovation, Transformation, and War: 
Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007, and 
Chad C. Serena’s, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War 
are recent additions to existing literature that illustrate contemporary examples of 
innovation and offer new ideas regarding the sources of change. 
The remainder of the literature review aims to do the following. First, the three 
core sources will be investigated thoroughly and the remaining works will be briefly 
                                                 
3 This based upon the assumption that the initial move toward transformation can be traced to 1999 
with the creation of the SBCT under President William Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen, 
and that the shift toward modularization started in 2003 under President George W. Bush and Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 
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explored to determine each of the main points as they relate to military change and 
innovation. Second, all of the works will be summarized according to any similarities or 
differences between them. Finally, this literature review will conclude by evaluating the 
overarching state of knowledge, paying close attention to any significant problems or 
knowledge gaps.  
1. Innovation: Theories and Ideas 
Of the relevant works concerning innovation and change, Barry R. Posen’s The 
Sources of Military Doctrine, offers the most expansive hypotheses, many of which have 
been challenged by others. On the surface, the title reference to doctrine suggests that 
Posen’s work is not relevant to a change in force structure. However, Posen notes that 
“military doctrine, particularly the aspects that relate directly to combat, is strongly 
reflected in the forces that are acquired by the military organization,” and is thus germane 
to the study at hand.4 Through the lens of two longstanding structural theories, those of 
organization and balance of power, Posen offers three causes of innovation.5  
Organization theory suggests that three factors–the organization’s purpose, its 
people, and the environment—influence change or stagnation. Balance of power theory, 
on the other hand, looks at the impact of state external pressures, mainly security 
concerns from existing or potential adversaries, on internal state decisions.6 From these 
theories, Posen offers three explanations of innovation. The first cause proposed is that 
“organizations will innovate when they fail.”7 Posen’s second cause for change is rooted 
in the belief that a military organization will innovate because it is made to do so by 
external pressure, mainly from the state’s civilian leadership. The final explanation for 
innovation is that an organization will do so if it wants to grow in size or power.8 
Although Posen’s work does not authoritatively propose that one cause reigns supreme 
                                                 
4 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World 
Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 14.  
5 Ibid., 34–38. 
6 Ibid., 40–43. 
7 Ibid., 47. 
8 Ibid. 
 4 
over the others, it does propose that two sources are most likely. Within organization 
theory, military failure and civilian intervention are the chief sources of innovation. 
Balance of power theory suggests that change is most easily influenced by civilian 
intervention, but also that fear caused by “events in the external environment,” increases 
a military organization’s openness to innovation.9      
Deborah D. Avant’s, Political Institutions and Military Change builds upon the 
structural theories that Posen used to formulate his argument. Avant adds international, 
domestic, and institutional theory to the equation when looking at military change. 
According to international theory, “military organizations should balance (or create 
appropriate doctrine) in response to external threats.”10 International theory differs from 
balance of power theory in that the latter contends that the military organization itself will 
innovate, whereas the former suggests that civilian intervention is a key catalyst for 
change. Domestic theory is concerned with internal organizational politics and 
bureaucratic processes that impact decision making. Institutional theory, similar to 
organizational theory, is concerned with the power that an organization has or seeks. 
However, institutional theory differs in that it suggests that actors will behave in ways 
that reward responsiveness to civilian leaders, and not behave in inflexible ways as 
organizational theory predicts.11 
While Avant notes that “military organizations should prefer offensive doctrine 
and be reluctant to change,” and that “civilian leaders should be more attuned to the 
demands of the international system and should intervene to force change if the threat is 
significant enough,” she primarily contends that “civilian intervention is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition,” for innovation.12 Thus, according to Political 
Institutions and Military Change, most innovation is the result of institutional theory, 
when “military organizations will be responsive to civilian goals when military leaders 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 75, 224. 
10 Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1994), 2. 
11 Ibid., 2–6. 
12 Ibid., 19, 5. 
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expect to be rewarded for that responsiveness.”13 Although Avant notes that some 
civilian intervention has been successful, she suggests that the best way to effect change 
is found in policymaker’s abilities to cue military leaders in to which changes will be 
rewarded most handsomely. 14  
Stephen Peter Rosen’s, Winning the Next War looks at military innovation from a 
different perspective. Like the works examined above, Rosen makes extensive use of case 
studies but looks at them through the prism of peacetime and wartime changes. 
Innovation during periods of peace is expected to occur when senior uniformed officers 
devise a plan to do so, “which has both intellectual and organizational components.”15 
Wartime innovation, aside from the obvious, differs from peacetime innovation in that 
military organizations “have less the character of stable political communities...and more 
the character of a functioning bureaucracy that has the strongest possible incentives to 
learn rationally from its experiences.”16 
Rosen asserts that peacetime innovation is slower to implement than wartime 
innovation. In searching for the main cause of peacetime innovation, the most important 
factor that drive military leaders to act is found in changes to the international or strategic 
security environment. Although wartime innovation is usually faster in relation to 
peacetime change, Rosen notes that the latter is no easier to accomplish than the former. 
Equating wartime innovation with changes to “measure(s) of strategic effectiveness,” the 
source of military innovation are found mainly in the organization’s perceived need to 
implement new tasks and concepts of operation that will make the force more likely to be 




                                                 
13 Ibid., 130. 
14 Ibid., 140. 
15 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 21. 
16 Ibid., 22. 
17 Ibid., 110. 
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conditions, one constant that Rosen suggests is that innovation during both periods is 
often the result of the identification of the need, and a desire to change which stems from 
respected senior military officers.18  
Contributing to the foundational works of Avant, Posen, and Rosen, from which 
this literature review is built upon, are the contributions from Brian McAllister Linn, 
Williamson Murray, and Allen Millett to the subject of military innovation. Of the three 
authors, Linn’s The Echo of Battle strays furthest, but not completely away, from earlier 
explanations of change. Looking back at the Army from its inception, Linn does not 
propose a new theory of innovation. Looking at cases such as the Army’s experiment 
with the Pentomic Division in the 1950s, and the failures in Vietnam, Linn’s focuses on 
the actions of Army senior leaders and how they fostered or stymied innovation.19 Noting 
that the service has been often ineffectual at changing to meet new security demands, 
Linn’s main thrust of his argument is aligned with organization theory in that “the army’s 
way of war has been shaped as much or more by its peacetime intellectual debate as by 
its wartime service.”20  
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, edited by Murray and Millett, is built 
upon the assumption “that innovation is natural and the result of a dynamic environment 
in which organizations must accept change if they are to survive,” and that “changes are 
inevitable given the technological developments occurring in civil society.”21 Despite the 
assumption that innovation is natural, Murray adds two theories of change. The first, 
revolutionary innovation is described as a result of top-down driven change that requires 
“leadership that is well-informed about the technical, as well as conceptual aspects of 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 21, 34, 109–110, 252–253. 
19 Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 177–185. 
20 Ibid., 234. 
21 Williamson Murray and Allan R .Millett, “Introduction,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar 
Period, ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5; 
Williamson Murray, “Innovation: Past and Future,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. 
Murray and Millett, 301.  
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possible innovation.”22 Murray’s idea of evolutionary innovation suggests that military 
change is a significant undertaking that takes a great deal of time. Noting that 
evolutionary innovation is the most likely type of change, it is characterized a “complex 
process involving organizational cultures, strategic requirements, the international 
situation, and the capacity to learn realistic, honest lessons from the past as well as 
present military experience.”23  
Chad C. Serena’s, A Revolution in Military Adaptation and James Russell’s 
Innovation, Transformation, and War both look at recent change that the American 
military experienced during conflict in Iraq. Serena argues that recent history and security 
policy shaped the way the U.S. Army would organize, train, and fight, and subsequently 
how it would change. Serena further asserts that prior decisions regarding force structure, 
strategy, and assessments regarding the international security environment made the 
Army more rigid and resistant to change. Although no new theory regarding innovation is 
advanced, the main argument as related to the overarching subject of military change 
proposes that any recent efforts prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq were driven by the 
“incorporation of technological capabilities.” Serena does note that while some civilian 
intervention occurred, changes to the strategic environment were mostly ignored.24 When 
examining the adaptive efforts of the Army in Iraq, Serena argues that innovation was 
decentralized, and that it “occurred by necessity.”25 Russell’s work argues along similar 
lines as Serena’s piece. Noting that some recent examples of military change were the 
result of top-down directives through civilian intervention, Russell proposes an 
alternative theory of innovation. Citing the counterinsurgency successes from lower level 
organizations, Russell asserts that one of the most recent, successful cases of military 
innovation was the result of bottom-up driven best practices that “led the Defense 
                                                 
22 Murray, “Innovation: Past and Future,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. Murray 
and Millett, 306. 
23 Ibid., 308. 
24 Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 1, 4, 25–26,47. 
25 Ibid., 160. 
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Department’s rear-echelon to reorient the organizational capabilities of American ground 
forces toward irregular warfare and counterinsurgency.”26  
2. Theoretical Similarities and Differences 
Generally, there is consensus from most scholars regarding the potential catalysts 
for military innovation. All of the works examined above agree that external pressure, 
namely from civilian leaders can spur change. Further, defeat or the threats of defeat 
during wartime, and changes to the security environment are also identified as a potential 
driver of change. Last, all of the authors note that change originating from within a 
military organization is possible. While there is agreement regarding the possible 
explanations for innovation, there is little consensus regarding which of the factors is the 
most likely cause. 
Posen argues most strongly that civilian intervention is one of the greatest drivers 
of innovation. Serena and Russell also identify civilian intervention as leading causes of 
innovation in some recent examples, yet both works look toward sources of innovation 
from within an organization as the major source of change. Murray also advocates that 
civilian intervention is a major driver of revolutionary innovation, similar to Posen’s idea 
regarding wartime change, but notes that cases of revolutionary innovation are extremely 
rare. Deborah Avant and Stephen Peter Rosen note the possibility of civilian intervention 
as a source of innovation but argue most strongly against it. Avant, by proposing that 
institutional theory best explains change, asserts that senior military leaders that feel they 
will be rewarded for being responsive to civilian desires have the most impact on 
innovation. Rosen also notes the influence of respected military officers, but he asserts 
that their understanding of the strategic environment is the most likely cause of 
innovation. 
Brian McAllister Linn, Williamson Murray, and Allen Millet offer explanations 
for innovation that fall outside of the two categories discussed above. Linn proposes that 
much of the meaningful change that the Army has experienced has been because of 
                                                 
26 James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar 
and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), ix. 
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professional, intellectual discussions during peacetime. Murray and Millet propose that 
innovation is inescapable, and that any organization that wishes to survive must do so. 
However, of all the possible justifications, Murray’s evolutionary innovation is the most 
expansive. It encompasses concepts that all the other possible explanations cite as driving 
factors. However, because Murray concedes that evolutionary innovation takes such a 
great deal of time, it is hard to determine where change starts and normal organizational 
progression ends.   
3. The State of Knowledge 
The state of knowledge regarding military innovation includes a number of 
complementary and competing theories and ideas. While no theory or idea can provide an 
answer for every example of military innovation, for every case, one reason can 
reasonably explain why change took place. However, aside from the works from Linn, 
Serena, and Russell, much of what has been written uses examples that date only as 
recent as the Vietnam War, while many examples are cited from the interwar period and 
from World War II. This does not mean that these theories and ideas are no longer 
applicable, as they still offer reasonable explanations for innovation.  
Although no significant gaps exist in the current literature regarding innovation, 
one of greatest problems is that most theories are limited by the reliance on one of the 
possible causes. Williamson Murray’s hypothesis of evolutionary innovation takes the 
most steps to guard against a theory that relies only on one cause, but since it assumes 
that innovation must take a great deal of time, it is less useful to explain rapid innovation. 
Because innovation is likely the result of any number of factors, a more multidimensional 
approach the problem should emerge. Military failure may spur civilian intervention, 
which in turn accelerates senior military officers to take action to preserve power, and 
satisfy the state’s security needs. However, no such theory or idea exists that could offer 
such a complex response to a multifaceted question.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The Army’s decision to move away from a division-centric force toward the 
modular BCT concept raises a number of inter-related issues to the central question of 
 10 
why it did so. What conditions changed within the Department of Defense (DoD) or 
within the Department of the Army (DA) that may have spurred or facilitated 
transformation? What impact did civilian leaders outside of the Army have on the 
service? What impact did the decision to convert selected units to Stryker Brigade 
Combat Teams have when the later decision to build a modular force was made? What 
did senior Army uniformed or civilian leaders understand about the strategic security 
environment? If these leaders sensed a change in the security environment, how did this 
impact modularization? The answers to many of these questions can help us understand 
why the Army made such a radical shift away from the division, however, it is unlikely 
that any one answer may do so alone. 
This thesis will be built upon three hypotheses that are influenced by much of the 
important literature regarding military change and innovation. The first hypothesis argues 
that the Army’s move toward modularization was a response to a changed or changing 
security environment or to changes to the service’s roles and missions. A second 
hypothesis suggests that the Army’s decision to change the force structure was the result 
of civilian intervention that forced the transformation. The third hypothesis contends that 
change occurred because of innovative leadership or thinking from the Army’s senior 
uniformed or civilian leaders. It is possible that evidence from any one hypothesis may be 
insufficient to answer the question. However, by exploring each hypothesis and the inter-
relation that the core idea of each has upon the others, an answer will emerge.   
This thesis finds that evidence from each hypothesis appeared in both the Army’s 
decision to create the SBCT and in the shift in focus toward the modular BCT. In the case 
of the creation of the SBCT, the impact of the security environment and changes to the 
Army’s roles and missions appeared as the strongest causal factor. Evidence of 
innovative leadership and thinking also was found as a likely explanation but to a lesser 
degree. Some evidence of civilian intervention was also discovered, but this factor was 
found to be the weakest of the three. In the case of the Army’s shift in transformation 
focus that led to creation to the modular BCT, civilian intervention appeared to be the 
strongest causal factor. The impact of the security environment also appeared to influence 
the civilians demanding change as well as the Army in its decision. While some evidence 
 11 
of innovative thinking and leadership from senior Army leaders was observed, its impact 
was weaker than either of the other two factors.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into four Chapters. The second Chapter 
utilizes a historical study to demonstrate the difference in the force structure between the 
pre- and post-transformational Army and document how it changed. This will be done by 
examining official Army documents such as the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap 
and the Army Guide to Modularity Version 1.0.  External documents and reports such as 
the RAND Corporation’s A Review of the Army’s Modular Force Structure, and Richard 
L. Kugler’s “Case Study in Army Transformation: Creating Modular Forces,” provide 
further background information and analysis that documents the change in the force 
structure and capabilities that modularization brought. 
Chapters III and IV consist of case studies looking at the decisions that created the 
SBCT and the modular force. Here the decision will be analyzed through each of the 
hypotheses to determine which provided the best explanation for change in each instance. 
Documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review Report from 1997, 2001, and  2006  
will be used to examine the relation between the Department of Defense and the Army, 
and perceptions about the strategic security environment, and to determine whether  
official documents had an impact on the decision to transform. These case studies will 
also look to congressional testimony, public speeches and interviews with senior civilians 
and to Army leaders to see what the decision makers of the times were saying about 
military change. The fifth and final Chapter explores the results of the case studies found 
in Chapters III and IV. Here, the conclusions drawn from the research are analyzed to 
determine consensus among the hypotheses in relation to Army transformation over the 
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II. ARMY TRANSFORMATION: THE STRYKER BRIGADE 
COMBAT TEAM AND MODULARIZATION  
In the twenty years since Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Army has undergone 
significant changes to its force structure. The Army that defeated Iraq in 1991 was 
centered on division-sized units of mainly two types: heavy and light.  The heavy 
divisions that consisted of mechanized infantry and armored brigades proved their 
usefulness against another heavily armored foe, but their inability to quickly deploy in 
world-wide contingencies proved to be their Achilles heel. Light units had a more limited 
role in Iraq’s defeat in 1991, and while they could be quickly deployed, they lacked 
mobility and heavy weapons. As a result of the shortcomings of the Army’s two 
centerpiece conventional units, General Eric Shinseki, while serving as the Army Chief 
of Staff, set his service on a course of transformation and modernization in 1999. Central 
to Shinseki’s vision was the creation of the interim brigade combat Team (later re-
designated the Stryker Brigade Combat Team); a unit that could leverage the mobility, 
and survivability of heavy units, and also be light enough to rapidly deploy. The Army 
has since transformed eight active duty units and one National Guard unit from light or 
heavy brigades to SBCTs while fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
While the decision made in 1999 to transform some heavy and light brigades to 
SBCTs was important to give the Army an additional capability, it only impacted a small 
segment of the force. In 2003, Shinseki’s successor, General Peter Schoomaker decided 
to “create a more effective fighting force by moving the Army from a division-based to a 
brigade-based structure.”27 As a result, the Army transformed its entire active-duty 
conventional fighting force to modular brigade combat teams during a six-year period. 
Transformation did not start and stop with the modular BCT. Modularity ushered in an 
era where division and corps headquarters no longer held rigid command and control 
relationships between themselves and the subordinate BCTs. Further, the Army’s 
logistical network underwent transformation to a modular support concept, where the 
                                                 
27 Stuart E. Johnson, John Peters, Karin E. Kitchens, Aaron Martin, and Jordan Fischbach, A Review 
of the Army’s Modular Force Structure (Santa Monica: RAND, 2012), 7.  
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BCT gained sustainment capabilities and support brigades were established to create 
tailored sustainment packages to support higher level commanders. 
The Army’s ability to execute transformation to the modular concept during a six-
year period while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan was nothing short of extraordinary. 
This Chapter aims to review where the Army came from and where it went during its 
journey. While the Army did transform its sustainment capabilities, and its reserve forces, 
this Chapter will briefly focus on the conceptual and organizational changes to the 
division, and corps and more deeply investigate the emergence of the Army’s centerpiece 
conventional fighting unit, the BCT (infantry, heavy, and Stryker). To do so, this Chapter 
will explore the pre-transformational Army as it stood to understand its composition and 
what it was doing before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Next, the development of the 
SBCT will be discussed as it can be seen as a precursor to the transformation to 
modularity.  Finally, the modular division, corps, and BCT will be explored to determine 
what changed to develop a more agile force. 
A. THE PRE-MODULAR ARMY 
According to Richard Kugler in his “Case Study in Army Transformation: 
Creating Modular Forces,” “the Army force structure that existed in 2001, when 
transformation accelerated, reflected several decades of experience that took place during 
World War II, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War decade of the 1990s.”28 While this 
section does not seek to investigate the entire pre-modular Army’s late history, it does 
seek to determine how the service was structured and what it was doing in a broad sense. 
In doing so, this section will serve as benchmark to compare where the Army came from 
to where it went during transformation.  A snapshot from 1999 will be used to illustrate 
what the pre-modular Army looked like because there are ample data regarding the 
activities and composition of the service, and it was the year Shinseki announced his 
decision to begin transformation. 
                                                 
28 Richard L. Kugler, “Case Study in Army Transformation: Creating Modular Forces,” Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy, 2008, 2.  
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In 1999, the active Army was composed of ten divisions and three separate 
brigades. As Kugler noted, the pre-modular force was a reflection of the recent past. 
Because of the experience of the Cold War and Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
against Iraq in 1991, it is not surprising that six of the ten divisions were of the heavy 
variety. The Army’s heavy divisions were named according to history and tradition, that 
is to say a heavy division could carry the title of an armored, infantry, or cavalry 
division.29 However, regardless of the designation, they were all formations that were 
based upon the M1 Abrams series tanks and M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. The 
four light divisions were exclusively light infantry, although the 82nd Airborne Division 
and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) did provide unique capabilities centered on 
parachute operations and helicopter assault operations. While no two divisions of any 
type were identical, they did maintain a number of similarities.30 
The typical division in 1999 consisted of three subordinate combat brigades, 
division artillery (DIVARTY, approximate to an artillery brigade), division support 
command (DISCOM, approximate to a support brigade), a reconnaissance 
battalion/squadron, and rotary-wing aviation, air defense, and engineer units as required. 
Because of this construct, the combat brigades relied upon the division for support 
(artillery, additional logistical support, engineers, etc.) as these functions were not found 
within the brigade. As such, the division was forced to task-organize units in an ad-hoc 
manner to ensure the combat brigades were supported to accomplish their assigned 
missions.31  
The combat brigades that compromised the bulk of the conventional Army’s 
fighting forces varied in composition in accordance with the division type they fell 
beneath. As such, there were seven distinct brigade types. The heavy brigades found 
within the heavy divisions were classified as either armored, or mechanized (infantry). 
                                                 
29 For example, the 1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, and 1st Armored Division were all 
heavy divisions. 
30 Department of Defense, Defense Almanac, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/almanac/, under “General 
Purpose Force Highlights”; Department of the Army, Army Posture Statement FY00 (February 1999), 
http://www.army.mil/aps/00/aps00.htm, under “Conventional Forces.” 
31 Christopher R. Liermann, “Restructuring the Division Support Command,” Army Logistics 
University,  http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MayJun03/MS862.htm. 
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Within the light divisions, there existed airborne, air assault, and light infantry brigades. 
While there were distinctly different types of brigades, they all shared some 
commonality. Generally, brigades were composed of three maneuver battalions and a 
brigade reconnaissance company/troop.32 While the light brigades were most similar in 
organization, the heavy brigades (armored and mechanized infantry) differed in name 
because of the number of associated subordinate battalions. As such, the forces assigned 
to an armored brigade included two tank battalions and one mechanized infantry 
battalion, whereas a mechanized brigade was made up of two mechanized infantry 
battalions and one tank battalion.33  
As noted earlier, there were three unique brigade-sized units that were not 
subordinate to any division headquarters, two of which were armored cavalry regiments 
(ACR). While the two ACRs were different in that one was light, equipped with high-
mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles, and the other was heavy, equipped with M1 
tanks and M2 cavalry fighting vehicles, they were similar in concept. Both ACRs were 
composed of three cavalry squadrons (battalion equivalent), which had three cavalry 
troops, an anti-tank company (light) or tank company (heavy) and a field artillery battery. 
The regiments also had their own organic rotary wing aircraft squadron, support 
squadron, military intelligence company, chemical company and engineer company. Like 
the SBCTs that would bridge the gap toward modular heavy and light BCTs, the pre-
modular Army’s armored cavalry regiments were self-supporting and sustaining 
organizations that could bring combined arms warfare to the battlefield.   
During the late 1990s, the Army continued to rely upon the division and corps to 
provide the required assets so the service could remain prepared for a number of 
contingencies.34  While the Army may have been prepared to employ such large forces, 
the notion of large unit employment did not match what the Army was actually doing. 
The Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal Year (FY) 1999, highlighted the 
                                                 
32 Tank and mechanized infantry battalions were comprised of four tank companies and four 
mechanized infantry companies respectively.   
33 Johnson and others, A Review of the Army’s Modular Force Structure, 13; Kugler, “Case Study in 
Army Transformation: Creating Modular Forces,” 7–9. 
34 Kugler, “Case Study in Army Transformation: Creating Modular Forces,” 8. 
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service’s major activities from October 1998 to October 1999. Because the United States 
was not fighting a major war, Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations garnered 
significant attention. The summary noted that nine combat brigades from the Army’s 
heavy divisions deployed and trained at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort 
Irwin, California. Another six combat brigades from heavy divisions conducted maneuver 
training at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany. 
Additionally, the CMTC hosted two mission readiness exercises for forces set to deploy 
to Kosovo.35  
In addition to training center rotations, Army forces and soldiers found 
themselves engaged in local training exercises, counter-drug operations as part of a Joint 
Task Force, and deployed to Bosnia, Kosovo, Saudi Arabia, the Sinai, and 77 other 
countries. In total, 109,000 soldiers were forward deployed from the continental United 
States, and 31,000 soldiers were engaged in operational deployments. Whether in the 
field for training or deployed abroad, some 126 units of varying size and type reported 
that their organizations spent more than 120 days away from their home station, while an 
additional 54 units reported being away for more than 180 days under the same criteria. 
The Army’s FY 1999 summary noted that the force structure of ten active and eight 
reserve divisions did accomplish all of its required missions; “but doing so placed heavy 
demands on some units” because of “the number of annual deployments having more 
than  tripled since the end of the Cold War when the Army fielded eighteen active and ten 
reserve-component divisions.”36 
In 1999, the Army exercised fifteen combat brigades in training center rotations, 
and deployed some 140,000 soldiers in eighty-one countries. Although Army divisions 
were forward deployed, no division deployed in mass for a contingency operation. The 
Army’s major contingency operation of 1999 was in illustrative example of the waning 
usefulness of the division as the building block for combat forces. When the Army 
deployed combat forces to Kosovo as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
                                                 
35 Jeffery A. Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary FY 1999 (Washington, DC: 
United States Army Center of Military History, 2006), 45–47. 
36Ibid., 48–53.  
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(NATO) peacekeeping mission in 1999, it did not deploy a full division. The 1st Infantry 
Division’s (ID) tactical command post did command and control the operation, but only 
one subordinate brigade was deployed beneath it. To increase the brigade’s capabilities to 
meet the mission’s requirements, extensive task organization changes were required. 
Thus, the 2nd Brigade, 1st ID deployed with two of its three maneuver battalions and was 
provided a field artillery battalion, a forward support battalion, and an engineer 
battalion.37 While the extensive task organization changes did not equate to mission 
failure, it may have increased friction and diminished efficiency. As General Schoomaker 
would testify five years after the initiation of the Kosovo operation, “the tailoring and 
task-organizing our current force structure for such operations renders an ad hoc 
deployed force and a non-deployed residue of partially disassembled units, diminishing 
the effectiveness of both.”38    
B. SHINSEKI’S VISION  
On October 12, 1999, General Shinseki announced that the U.S. Army would 
“start changing now to develop a force that is strategically responsive and dominant 
across the spectrum of operations.”39 On March 1, 2000, Shinseki testified before the 
Senate’s Armed Services Committee and provided his rationale for transformation. 
Shinseki’s vision was striking considering the then unknown future would include the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as he stated: 
The Army must simultaneously effect a comprehensive transformation to 
better meet current and future strategic requirements. With the emergence 
of an increasingly complex international security environment, sources of 
conflict and tension are increasing. Sources of unrest and conflict range 
from competition between states to the instability caused by the collapse 
                                                 
37 R. Cody Phillips, Operation Joint Guardian: The U.S. Army in Kosovo (Washington, DC: United 
States Army Center of Military History, 2007), 18.  
38 Johnson and others, A Review of the Army’s Modular Force Structure, 11. 
39 Gerry J. Gilmore, “Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki.” Army News Service, 
October 13, 1999.  
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of states unable to meet the strains of resource scarcity, population growth, 
and ethnic and religious militarism.40 
Shinseki’s approach to transformation was three-pronged, and included the 
legacy, interim, and objective forces. This campaign called for the sustainment of legacy 
force units equipped with existing systems, and the creation of interim force units 
equipped with “a yet-to-be-selected, off-the-shelf system.”41 The interim force was seen 
as a bridge between the legacy force and the objective force. The objective force Shinseki 
envisioned would be equipped with future combat systems and totally modernize the 
Army. While the objective force would take years to achieve, Shinseki set his sights on 
creating the interim force quickly. 
In order to transform the first units designated to become interim brigade combat 
teams, Shinseki and the Army required funding, to provide the resources called for in the 
transformation plan.42 A number of factors assisted Shinseki in jump-starting his vision. 
A thirteen-year trend of declining buying power for the Army was reversed in FY 1999. 
In early 2000, the Army restructured a number of competing programs, and pulled money 
from under-performing programs, which allowed for $537 million to be set aside for 
procurement of the interim armored vehicle (later re-designated Stryker). Shinseki also 
requested additional funding from Congress in 2000, and received an additional 
$3.2 billion for Army transformation programs to include the creation of the interim 
force. Because Shinseki reallocated funding within the Army’s budget, and because 
Congress was largely receptive to his aggressive vision for transformation, the first two 
SBCTs were training and organizing by December 2000.43 
                                                 
40 Fiscal Year 2001 Budget and Posture of the United States Army: Hearing Before the Committee on 
Armed Services, United States Senate, 106th Cong. 4 (2000) (statement of General Eric K. Shinseki, U.S. 
Army Chief of Staff). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Sydney Freedberg, “The New Model Army,” National Journal, June 3, 2000, 1756.  
43 Neil Baumgardner, “Army Pushing for More Brigade Funding,” Defense Daily, March 14, 2000; 
“Army Transformation Begins Its Second Year,” Army, December 1, 2000; Freedberg, “The New Model 
Army,” 1750–1756.; Fiscal Year 2001 Budget and Posture of the United States Army: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 106th Cong. 12–14 (2000) (statement of General Eric 
K. Shinseki, U.S. Army Chief of Staff). 
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The units selected to become the first two SBCTs began training and re-
organizing prior to the selection of the vehicle that the unit would be based upon. 
Shinseki made it clear in his vision for transformation that the unit would be lethal, 
mobile, and deployable. Among his goals was to create a brigade-sized unit that could be 
deployed worldwide within ninety-six hours. Shinseki preferred to form the brigade 
around a wheeled vehicle that was lighter than most tracked vehicles and more survivable 
than the wheeled vehicles already in the Army’s inventory. Based largely on Shinseki’s 
preference for a wheeled vehicle platform, the Army selected General Dynamics Light 
Armored Vehicle-III from thirty-five similar vehicles to become the interim armored 
vehicle (Stryker). The Stryker family of vehicles fit well within Shinseki’s vision for the 
future. As a bridge between the legacy and objective force, the Stryker provided a 
common platform from which its ten variants (infantry carrier, mortar carrier, medical 
evacuation, reconnaissance, engineer, anti-tank, fire-support, mobile gun system, nuclear, 
biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance, and commander’s vehicle), were based. 
The commonality found within each variant reduced logistical constraints as they used 
the same parts and required fewer military occupational specialties to maintain the 
vehicles.44  
Selecting a wheeled vehicle to equip the interim brigades was an important and 
controversial decision, but equally significant was the change in how the brigades were 
organized. The SBCT concept was significant because it added combat power to the 
formation. At its core, the SBCT was organized around three infantry battalions. The 
SBCT was further strengthened with the addition of a reconnaissance, surveillance and 
target acquisition (RSTA) squadron and a field artillery battalion. In addition, the SBCT 
was outfitted with its own engineer company, signal company, anti-tank company, and 
military intelligence company. The SBCT was designed to be supported logistically from 
an internal brigade support battalion, which included transportation, medical, and 
maintenance companies. As a result, the SBCT could project three maneuver battalions, 
                                                 
44 Harold Kennedy, “Army’s New Combat Vehicle to Undergo Additional Tests,” National Defense, 
December 2000, 35; U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army’s Evaluation of 
Stryker and M–113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated 
Comparison (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 2–4.; Gilmore, “Army to develop 
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conduct its own reconnaissance with the RSTA squadron, and support itself with indirect 
fires from its organic field artillery battalion. This type of combined arms brigade sized 
unit was unique and only the Army’s two armored cavalry regiments had a similar 
capability when the SBCT concept was developed. With the Stryker vehicle selected, and 
the unit organization drafted, the Army’s first SBCT began to test and field the 
equipment in 2002 that it would take to war in 2003.45 
In April 2002, the first Stryker vehicles began rolling off the assembly lines and 
into the hands of the soldiers that would be using them. By August 2002, parts of the 3rd 
Brigade, 2nd ID (3/2 SBCT), based at Fort Lewis, WA had fielded the vehicles, and to 
demonstrate their deployability, a company sized element was transported via Air Force 
C-130 aircraft to Fort Irwin, CA. The brigade also conducted comparison testing between 
the Stryker and the M-113A3 tracked armored personnel carrier as required by FY 2001 
National Defense Authorization Act. This testing was the result of concerns regarding the 
cost, maneuverability and survivability of the Stryker. These concerns were raised largely 
by Senator Rick Santorum, whose home state of Pennsylvania produced the M113.46    
Congressional mandated testing was important to Army transformation for a 
number of reasons. Until testing was complete, the Army’s budget to buy the Stryker for 
the first two selected units was reduced by 20 percent. This had no impact on 3/2 SBCT’s 
transformation timeline, but increased the timeline to field the second brigade scheduled 
to receive the Stryker. The Army was also unable to purchase Strykers for the additional 
four brigades scheduled to be converted to SBCTs.47 While these units were not expected 
to complete transformation until 2006, they would fall further behind because of the time 
required to manufacture the vehicles after they were purchased. Further, successful 
testing of the Stryker would silence the critics that opposed the use of a wheeled vehicle 
when a suitable tracked vehicle was already in the Army’s inventory. The United States 
General Accounting Office (GAO) official report regarding vehicle testing concluded that 
                                                 
45 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3–20.21: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry 
Battalion (Washington, DC: GPO, 2003), 1–1 – 1–22.  
46 Dennis Steele, “Realizing the Army Vision,” Army, December 2002, 48; Kennedy, “Army’s New 
Combat Vehicle to Undergo Additional Tests,” 35. 
47 Kennedy, “Army’s New Combat Vehicle to Undergo Additional Tests,” 36. 
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the testing “provided sufficient data to determine the two vehicles’ relative 
effectiveness,” and “concluded that the Stryker provided more advantages in force 
protection, support for dismounted assault, and close fight and mobility and was more 
survivable against ballistic and nonballistic threats.”48 
3/2 SBCT completed its fielding of the Stryker family of vehicles in January 2003 
after selected units within the brigade completed comparison testing. After General 
Shinseki’s retirement in June 2003, 3/2 SBCT deployed to Mosul, Iraq to execute 
counter-insurgency operations in October. The second brigade selected for 
transformation, the 1st Brigade, 25th ID (1/25 SBCT) completed its transformation in 
January 2004, and replaced 3/2 SBCT in Iraq in October 2004. While both SBCTs that 
deployed in the first few years of the Iraq war proved to be extremely capable, the 
Stryker vehicle and SBCT concept were not immune to scrutiny.49     
1. Stryker Development: Concerns and Results 
Concerns regarding the Stryker and the SBCT concept were prevalent in the first 
few years of transformation. Critics of the decision to select a wheeled vehicle platform 
over a tracked platform were very vocal and tried to discredit the concept. The Air Force 
also raised valid concerns regarding the feasibility to meet deployment timelines 
associated with the SBCT concept. Higher-than-expected procurement costs and 
construction projects increased the projected budget for transformation. Additionally, 
production delays for the mobile gun system, and the NBC reconnaissance variant 
precluded their inclusion into SBCT formations until 2006. While many of these 
concerns were valid, they become less prevalent as SBCTs demonstrated their agility and 
ability in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Victor O’Reilly was one of the most vocal critics of the Stryker following its 
selection as the interim armored vehicle. O’Reilly drafted a 108-page critique of the 
vehicle and concept on behalf of Congressman Jim Saxton, a former Republican 
                                                 
48 U.S. General Accounting Office, Army’s Evaluation Provided Sufficient Data,  i.  
49 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Transformation: Fielding of Army’s Stryker 
Vehicles Is Well Under Way, but Expectations for Their Transportability by C–130 Aircraft Need to Be 
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representative from New Jersey. At its core, O’Reilly’s criticism was focused on the 
selection of the Stryker over the M-113A3 and other legacy force equipment to include 
the M1 tank and M2 infantry fighting vehicle. He discredited the Stryker’s mobility, fire-
power and crew-protection based upon the rocket-propelled grenade threat encountered in 
Iraq during the first few months of occupation. He also questioned the credibility 
regarding the testing that the GAO found satisfactory. Further, he questioned Shinseki’s 
character and accused him of corruption and being dishonest. The critique was damning 
of the Stryker and SBCT concept, but mostly without merit. Its largest failing was that it 
championed the M113 over the more versatile and technologically superior Stryker. The 
bombastic language of the report was a thin veneer for its real reason: to discredit the 
Stryker to promote the spending required to modify the ageing M113 fleet that could not 
compete on the modern battlefield. 50      
While O’Reilly’s critique was largely unproven, the RAND Corporation and the 
GAO raised valid concerns over the ability to meet the deployment timelines set forth by 
Shinseki. RAND found “that a force with more than 1,000 vehicles cannot be deployed 
by air from (continental United States) CONUS to the far reaches of the globe in four 
days,” but “it is possible to achieve deployment timelines on the order of one to two 
weeks.”51 The GAO report raised further questions regarding the Stryker’s ability to be 
transported via C-130 aircraft. The GAO found that the Stryker’s weight made it too 
heavy for C-130 transport for anything further than 1,000 miles under the most ideal 
conditions. Considering that C-130 transportability was a key factor to the Stryker’s 
selection as the interim armored vehicle, this was a significant failure of the 
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51 Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team : 
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C-130 aircraft and did not factor them into their calculations. Regardless, the SBCT 
concept failed in practice to meet Shinseki’s goal of deploying a lethal, brigade-sized unit 
within 96 hours.52 
Other concerns regarding the SBCT and transformation centered on the failures to 
meet projected costs, and production timelines. Shinseki’s plan for a total of six SBCTs 
was estimated to cost $7.1 billion. Stryker production costs exceeded projections by  
$390 million, while military construction costs required for the SBCTs supporting 
infrastructure exceeded projections by $1.01 billion. In total, the costs associated with the 
transformation of the first six brigades exceeded estimates by $1.6 billion. Further, the 
first four SBCT deployments were unable to utilize two Stryker variants due to 
production issues. The mobile gun system and NBC reconnaissance variants were both 
delayed due to the time required to develop and test the new technology found in each 
vehicle type. Both variants did not go into full production until 2006-2007. Subsequent 
deploying SBCTs did have both variants available, starting with the 4th Brigade, 2nd ID 
which deployed to Iraq in April, 2007.53 
Criticism of the Stryker and SBCT concept largely subsided as additional 
brigades were transformed to SBCTs and the Army set a course toward modularity. 
While some of it was baseless and founded on the preference for tracked vehicles, valid 
concerns regarding the ability to strategically deploy an SBCT within ninety-six hours 
still remain. Even if the RAND Corporation’s calculations were correct, deploying an 
SBCT via air within one to two weeks is still much quicker than the time required to 
transport a heavy brigade combat team via ship. Where the creation of the SBCT can be 
seen as an attempt to increase the power projection of the U.S. Army, the decision to 
transform combat brigades to the modular BCTs can be seen as the Army’s attempt to 
increase the agility of the force by creating like units that could be interchanged within an 
area of operations as required.  
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C. TRANSFORMATION TO MODULARITY 
While the decisions that were made in 1999 to start Army transformation through 
the creation of the SBCT affected a small portion of the Army’s combat power, 
Shinseki’s successor, General Peter Schoomaker, expanded transformation through a 
vision of modularity. Schoomaker’s vision abolished the notion of the legacy, interim and 
objective force. As such, Shinseki’s legacy and interim forces became Schoomaker’s 
current force and the objective force became the future force.54 The change in 
terminology signaled a shift away from three distinct force types to the current force’s 
modular structure and the future force’s potential structure based upon the future combat 
systems (FCS).  
The decision to transform to the modular force in 2003 introduced a number of 
significant changes to the structures, capabilities, and responsibilities of the Army’s 
combat brigades, divisions, and corps. Conceptually, two types of higher headquarters 
were designed to replace the division, corps, and echelons above corps. Traditionally, 
corps and divisions were permanently assigned subordinate maneuver, combat support 
(CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces. Corps level CS and CSS units could be 
employed to provide capabilities not found within the division, and division level CS and 
CSS units could be employed to provide capabilities to the division’s subordinate combat 
brigades. While these higher level headquarters would retain their historical designation, 
i.e., I Corps, they would operate under the unit of employment construct.  
The Unit of Employment y (UEy) was to replace the numbered field armies and 
corps, while the Unit of Employment x (UEx) was to replace the division. With the 
advent of the unit of employment, corps and divisions essentially became modular 
headquarters that could control forces within an area of operations. Units of employment 
would therefore no longer maintain a number of permanently assigned units and maintain 
a rigid force structure. Instead subordinate modular forces could be assigned based upon 
the force requirements to meet the demands of the mission. Interestingly, the term unit of 
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employment was never codified in Army field manuals, although the Army 
Comprehensive Guide to Modularity and the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap did 
use the terms abundantly. By the time Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations, was revised 
in 2008, the term unit of employment was dropped from Army lexicon. Although the 
terms corps and division remained in doctrine, their defined roles mirrored those found 
within the unit of employment concept.55 
Where the Army’s transformation to modularity decreased the permanently 
assigned capabilities at the corps and division, it increased the capabilities within the 
subordinate combat brigades. In a manner similar to the unit of employment concept, 
combat brigades were designated units of action (UA). UAs were to become much like 
the traditional armored cavalry regiments and would “gain improved force packaging, 
sustainability, battle command and situational awareness while retaining the same 
lethality as the larger, task-organized brigade combat teams.”56 In addition to the units of 
action, transformation created a number of modular support brigades. These included the 
following: battlefield surveillance brigade, fires brigade, combat aviation brigade, 
sustainment brigade, maneuver enhancement brigade, and the functional brigade.57 
Much like the term unit of employment, the term unit of action was also removed 
from Army lexicon. While the term UA was used interchangeably with the term brigade 
combat team from the outset in transformation publications, once modularization was 
codified in doctrine, only the term BCT remained. Because the transformed BCTs would 
emerge as the Army’s primary conventional force building block, the rest of section aims 
to explain the structure of the different BCTs and compare them to their predecessors.58 
In doing so, it becomes clear that the transformation to modularity not only created 
standardized organizations with greater capabilities but a lighter force as well. 
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nuclear (CBRN), air and missile defense, signal, explosive ordnance disposal, medical, and intelligence.   
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General Schoomaker remarked in his testimony to Congress in July 2004 that no 
two like units from the division level to the company level were identical.59 The 
development of the BCT sought to standardize the Army’s tactical formations. In 
addition to the earlier developed SBCT, the Army would create the Heavy Brigade 
Combat Team (HBCT) and the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).  The HBCT was 
designed to replace the former armored and mechanized infantry combat brigades, while 
the IBCT sought to replace the former light infantry brigades. The result of the 
transformation to the modular BCT was three distinct types of combat units with distinct 
capabilities. 
The creation of the HBCT not only standardized the organization in terms of 
subordinate armor and mechanized units, but also added additional capabilities not 
previously found in armored and mechanized infantry brigades. With “unmatched tactical 
mobility and firepower,” HBCTs were designed to “execute operations with shock and 
speed.”60 In terms of organization, the HBCT included two combined-arms battalions 
(CAB), one armed reconnaissance squadron (ARS), one field artillery battalion, one 
brigade special troops battalion (BSTB), and one brigade support battalion (BSB). 
Pushing the combined arms concept to lower levels, the CAB included two M1 series 
tank companies and two M2 series mechanized rifle companies. In addition, the CAB 
possessed an organic mortar platoon, scout platoon, and a sniper section. To best support 
the brigade and its maneuver forces, the BSB included maintenance, medical, 
transportation, and forward support companies,61 while the BSTB included engineer, 
signal, and military intelligence companies. In total, the HBCT counted thirty subordinate 
company-sized units allowing the HBCT to conduct operations across the spectrum of 
conflict through its own firepower and support capabilities.62 
                                                 
59 Army Transformation: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of 
Representatives,  108th Cong. 19–20. (2004) (statement of General Peter J. Schoomaker, U.S. Army Chief 
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60 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-90.6: Brigade Combat Team (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2010), 1–7.    
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Much like the HBCT, the creation of the IBCT standardized infantry 
organizations while providing additional capabilities. Although three types of infantry 
brigades (infantry, air assault, and airborne) remained in the force structure, they were 
designed to be identical regardless of their method of transportation or employment. 
“Organized around dismounted infantry,” IBCT’s were “optimized for operations in close 
terrain, such as swamps, woods, hilly and mountainous areas, and densely populated 
areas.”63 The IBCT was organized in a similar fashion to the HBCT. The IBCT counted 
two infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion, one reconnaissance squadron, one 
brigade special troops battalion, and one brigade support battalion. An infantry battalion 
included three rifle companies, a weapons company equipped with wheeled vehicles and 
anti-tank capabilities, and a mortar platoon, scout platoon, and sniper section. The 
IBCT’s BSB and BSTB included the same company sized elements found within the 
HBCT.  All told, the IBCT included thirty subordinate company-sized units designed to 
be easily deployed and “optimized for offensive operations against conventional and 
unconventional forces in rugged terrain.”64    
Official Army transformation publications and outside analysts concur that the 
drive toward modularity was based upon the decision to move away from the division-
centric force structure toward self-contained BCTs. The RAND Corporation’s A Review 
of the Army’s Modular Force Structure, notes that in addition to modularity, “the service 
also embarked on the effort to grow the Army and to rebalance the force.”65 Army 
growth and transformation to modularity resulted in the increase from the thirty-three 
pre-modular active combat brigades in 2001 to forty-five modular BCTs in 2010.66 Of the 
forty-five active BCTs, there were: sixteen HBCTs, twenty-one IBCTs, and eight SBCTs. 
Where the pre-modular Army was predominantly heavy, the modular Army became more 
balanced with the reduction of armor battalions, the increase in infantry battalions, and 
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the increased number of SBCTs.67 There were criticisms regarding the organization of 
the BCT, specifically in regards to the decreased number of maneuver battalions the 
BCT.68 However, the RAND Corporation noted in 2012 that “the BCTs are generally 
better armed and staffed that the units they superseded,” and “the current force structure 
features superior versatility to the division-centric structure.”69  
D. CONCLUSION 
General Eric Shinseki stated that, “Army transformation represents the strategic 
transition we will have to undergo to shed our Cold War designs, to prepare ourselves 
now for the crises and wars of the 21st century. It is also a test of our institutional agility 
and our heart as an Army.”70 The Stryker brigade concept was only one of a number of 
initiatives to meet Shinseki’s vision of transformation. Shinseki’s transformation 
restructured unit organization above the battalion level, re-focused manning priorities 
Army-wide, and re-worked much of the Army’s outdated doctrine. While these initiatives 
were necessary for a successful transformation as a whole, the creation and fielding of the 
SBCT provided a capability that was lacking in a changing world. The SBCT provided a 
lethal, survivable, deployable, combined-arms brigade that was built around a new 
vehicle. Amazingly, the SBCT went from concept to reality within four years, due in 
large part to Shinseki’s vision and leadership. In the face of criticism, Shinseki drove the 
Army toward transformation harder and faster than anyone since World War II.  
When General Peter Schoomaker assumed his position as the Army Chief of 
Staff, the Army was well on its way in its efforts to transform selected units to SBCTs. 
Leveraging the inertia gained from Shinseki’s leadership toward transformation, 
Schoomaker exported the limited effort to the wider Army. Force structure from the corps 
to the battalion was changed to make the brigade combat team the center-piece of the 
Army’s fighting force. As the Army transformed to a modular force, the service grew in 
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size as well. While fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army increased the number of 
BCTs by twelve and adjusted the force structure away from the reliance on heavy forces 
toward the greater balance between heavy, light, and medium weight forces. Although it 
would take the Army nearly six years to complete the transformation toward modularity, 
the force that emerged was better suited to meet the challenges the Army faced across the 
full spectrum of conflict.71   
 
                                                 
71 Johnson and others, A Review of the Army’s Modular Force Structure, 10–11, 39. 
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III. CASE STUDY: ARMY TRANSFORMATION AND THE 
STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM 
General Shinseki’s 1999 decision to set the Army down a path toward 
transformation sought to be “the most significant effort to change the Army in 
100 years,” and the aim was “not a single platform swapout, but a systemic change and 
full integration of multidimensional capabilities.”72 While not all of the lofty goals set 
forth, such as the creation of the objective force, were met during Shinseki’s term as 
Army Chief of Staff, nor by his successors, the Army did successfully develop, field, 
train, and deploy Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. This chapter seeks to determine why 
the decision to transform the Army in 1999 was made, specifically the decision to create 
the SBCT.  The literature regarding military innovation offers a number of theories that 
seek to answer the question of why military organizations change. Based upon the 
theories identified in the first chapter, this chapter seeks to examine three hypotheses that 
may best explain why the Army sought transformation and decided to generate SBCTs. 
The first hypothesis suggests that the decision to begin transformation was a 
logical response to a changed or changing security environment and to the Army’s 
expected roles and missions for the future. This hypothesis is constant with Barry Posen, 
Deborah Avant, and Stephen Peter Rosen, who all assert that changes in the external 
security environment have influence in decisions related to military change and 
innovation.73 The second hypothesis contends that the Army’s decision was the result of 
civilian leadership that forced the service to change.74 This hypothesis is based upon 
Posen’s organization theory and balance of power theory, which both emphasize the 
importance of civilian intervention in military innovation.75 The final hypothesis argues 
                                                 
72 The Army Transformation: Hearing Before the Airland Subcommittee, Committee on Armed 
Services, United States Senate,  106th Cong. 9 (1999) (statement of General Eric K. Shinseki, U.S. Army 
Chief of Staff). 
73 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 74–75; Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, 
2; Rosen, Winning the Next War, 75–76. 
74 Civilian leadership for the purposes of this hypothesis are those that extort control or influence from 
outside the Army such as the president, the Secretary of Defense, or assistant secretaries.  
75 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 75, 224. 
 32 
that the Army’s decision to change was largely the result of innovative thinking from the 
Army’s top uniformed and civilian leaders and their staffs. This hypothesis is constant 
with the literature that notes that change does not need an external influence, but can 
originate from within an organization.76   
To investigate the three hypotheses, this Chapter is mainly concerned with the 
immediate time period before and after the decision to transform the Army in 1999. 
However, as the decision to transform may be traced to events, conceptual developments, 
and analysis that occurred earlier, some sources date from the early to mid-1990s. This 
Chapter uses a variety of primary and secondary sources to arrive at its conclusion. Chief 
among these sources are the National Defense Panel’s Transforming Defense: National 
Security in the 21st Century, official DoD publications such as the Report of the 
Quadrennial Defense Review published in May 1997 (1997 QDR), and Joint Vision 2010, 
as well as statements and interviews from Shinseki, Major General James Dubik and 
others. In doing so, this chapter finds that there is evidence that elements of each 
hypothesis were present in the Army’s decision, but that the cause is likely rooted in the 
senior Army leadership who were influenced by a changed security environment.   
A. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND TRANSFORMATION 
To prove or disprove the first hypothesis, which argues that the Army’s decision 
to transform was a logical response to a changed or changing security environment and to 
changing roles and missions, it is important to understand what was known or perceived 
about the world and the Army at the time. In 1999, the United States and its Army were 
experiencing a period of relative peace less than a decade removed from the end of the 
Cold War. Despite this relatively peaceful period, the Army still maintained some 
122,000 personnel forwarded deployed across the world to include forces in support of 
operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.77 While the Army’s posture in 1999 was in part a 
reflection of the Cold War past as indicated by the presence of large numbers of soldiers 
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in Europe and Asia, it also was a glimpse into what the future may hold which was 
signified by the then on-going operations in the Balkans. 
The Cold War’s end in 1991 signified a major change in the United State’s role in 
the global security environment. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army’s 
security posture was largely predicated on the threats associated with the Soviet Union 
and a need to conduct a large-scale, high-intensity conflict.78  With the Soviet Union’s 
demise, America’s long-standing threat was eliminated, creating a sense of uncertainty in 
the security environment. In the time period between the end of the Cold War and 
Shinseki’s transformation announcement, those concerned with the security environment 
took action to describe and predict what was to come in the future. If the Cold War world 
based on American and Soviet competition was dangerous, but stable and predictable, the 
post Cold War world was deemed challenging and unpredictable. Pertinent DoD 
documents such as Joint Vision 2010, the QDR from 1997, and the DoD sponsored 
National Defense Panel’s Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, 
all highlighted the unpredictable nature of the then current and future security 
environments.79 Such unpredictability was rooted not only within the wide-array of 
potential types of threat, but also in the potential locations where the United States could 
expect to conduct full spectrum operations.80 
The perceived challenges associated with unpredictable locations of future 
conflict areas coupled with a wide array of potential military operations contrasted 
greatly with the Army’s Cold War focus that was predicated on geographically based 
threats.”81 Thus, the geo-strategic security environment in the mid to late-1990s would 
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not permit the Army’s reliance on forward-stationed units and pre-positioned equipment 
to meet the demands in far-flung locations around the globe. Further, predictions about 
the future security environment placed a premium on the United State’s ability to project 
power into areas where there was no American presence or military footprint.82 
However, until Shinseki’s announcement in 1999, the Army had made little effort to 
change its force structure or posture to meet the challenges that it had encountered in its 
recent history, and those that many experts predicted for the future.83 
In addition to the wide array of potential threats and geographical locations that 
the post-Cold-War American military would need to consider, the United States was also 
aware of the impact of technology in the global security environment. At the forefront of 
technological change were the advances in information technologies. In the mid to late 
1990s, Information-related technologies and other emerging technologies were believed 
to be creating a revolution in military affairs (RMA).84 The RMA implied “a growing 
potential to detect, identify, and track far greater numbers of targets over a larger area for 
a longer time than ever before.”85 As such, the potential impact of the RMA and the 
harnessing of RMA related technologies was a binding force in the prominent literature 
regarding the future of the American military.86 
As documents such as the QDR from 1997, Transforming Defense: National 
Security in the 21st Century, and Joint Vision 2010 all originated from the Department of 
Defense, it is clear that the DoD and the Army were aware of the changes in the security 
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environment and the potential impact of technological developments.87 Further, it also 
appears that the United States was also aware that the military service component’s roles 
and missions had changed and that additional change was possible in the future. While 
the changed or evolving roles and missions that the Army could expect to undertake in 
the future may have been largely based on a changing security environment, American 
strategic vision and leadership in the form of military doctrine was also a contributing 
factor.88 Although the source of changed or changing roles and missions is important in 
military innovation in general, when looking into the Army’s decision in 1999, the main 
goal is to identify the change itself and any rationale that could have driven 
transformation.  
As noted earlier, the Army that existed during the Cold-War was heavily focused 
on high-intensity conflict with the Soviet Union. However, the United States was 
involved in military operations and wars during the Cold War, such as the Vietnam War 
and interventions in Panama and Grenada that were outside the realm of high-intensity 
conflict with the Soviets.89 During the break-up of the Soviet Union and after the end of 
the Cold-War, the Army continued to find itself involved in conflict of some sort. These 
operations ranged from war with Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War to intervention missions 
in Somalia, Kosovo, and Bosnia.90 Although the Army may have been “geared to fight 
big wars,” there were numerous instances, both during and after the Cold War, that 
indicate that the Army’s role within the DoD was to conduct missions within smaller 
wars and operations other than war (OOTW).91 
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The pre-transformational Army may have been largely invested to fight big wars, 
but its recent experiences trended toward smaller conflicts. This contradiction was likely 
rooted in the DoD’s strategy that was predicated on simultaneously fighting two wars in 
two distinct major theaters of operations.92 The two-theater of war strategy was 
reaffirmed in 1997 and was likely seen as a prudent precaution against any number of 
regional powers that had “both the desire and means to challenge U.S. interests 
militarily.”93 At the same time, the DoD recognized the increase in lesser conflicts and 
interventions and the potential risks posed by terrorism. As such, the Report of the 
Quadrennial Defense Review called for a full-spectrum force that could execute a wide 
array of military operations.94 
When the Army set down a course toward transformation in 1999, there were 
elements of continuity as well as a sense of change within the service’s roles and 
missions. First and foremost, the Army’s overarching role, “to fight and win our nation’s 
wars,” had not changed.95 As part of Joint Vision 2010’s full-spectrum dominance 
construct within a high-intensity conflict, the Army expected to and was likely required 
to provide the bulk of the land component for a ground combat campaign.96 Further, the 
Army expected that it would continue to conduct peacekeeping operations and 
interventions in failing states.97 Thus, the Army’s potential roles and missions were 
believed to span the full-spectrum of military operations from high-intensity conflict with 
a regional power to peacekeeping operations in a less-developed state.  
While the Army had conducted all of the types of missions listed above in the 
past, the evidence suggests that when the decision to transform was made, there was an 
expectation that operations on the lower scale of intensity would continue to grow in 
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scope and number.98 Coupled with a wide array of potential missions, was the belief that 
the Army’s force structure was unsuitable to meet future demands. The pre-
transformational Army’s mix of heavy and light divisions was unbalanced in regards to 
capabilities and operational responsiveness. While the Army’s heavy forces were deemed 
very capable, they were slow to deploy and required an immense logistical support 
network. The light forces on the other-hand were more agile and could deploy more 
quickly, but were found lacking in survivability and lethality.99 
The decision to create the SBCT may have been conceived as a way to bridge the 
gap between the Army’s heavy and light forces as well as between the legacy and 
objective forces envisioned within the greater transformation initiative.100 As a bridge 
between the heavy and light forces, the SBCT provided increased lethality and inter-
theater mobility over the light forces, and provided increased deployability and agility 
over the heavy forces. The SBCT could also span the gap between the legacy and 
objective forces by validating existing technologies and developing doctrine and training 
that could be further harnessed by the objective force of the future.101 However, creating 
a stop-gap that could fill an operational shortfall was likely done to provide a needed 
capability that was necessary due to a changed and evolving global security environment 
and the roles and missions that the Army could be expected to execute.   
There is evidence that changes in the security environment impacted the Army’s 
decision to begin transformation. As the leader of the Army’s transformation effort to 
create the SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington, Major General Dubik credited the changed 
security environment, especially the end of the Cold-War as a driver of innovation. 
Shinseki echoed this sentiment, but added that smaller scale operations were increasingly 
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likely which highlighted the capability gap between light and heavy forces. Further, both 
Shinseki and Dubik indicated in interviews with the Public Broadcasting Service that 
America’s enemies had likely learned that the Army’s greatest vulnerability was tied to a 
reliance on developed air and sea ports needed to deploy heavy forces.102 Creating and 
fielding a medium-weight brigade-sized combat unit that could deploy to under-
developed airfields was a suitable solution that provided a needed capability. 
There is further evidence that future Army roles and missions played a part in the 
decision to transform. General Shinseki’s testimony before the Senate’s Armed Forces 
Committee in early March 2000 noted that the Army’s mission requirements had 
increased, and that the pre-transformational force was not optimal to meet the challenges 
of full spectrum operations. In addition, Shinseki highlighted a need for the Army to 
increase its strategic responsiveness across a wide array of potential missions.103 The 
decision to develop the SBCT can be seen as a solution to the problems that a full 
spectrum force could encounter. The SBCT had inherent lethality in its infantry-centric 
formations that could operate in wide latitude of operational environments to include 
urban terrain, but was also well suited to conduct operations on the lower scale of 
intensity to include peacekeeping operations.  
A changed or changing security environment and changed or changing roles and 
missions are plausible drivers that spurred the Army’s decision to begin transformation in 
1999. Documents originating from the DoD highlight the changes that the security 
environment had undergone after the end of the Cold War. Although the Army had not 
undertaken any major innovative changes until the decision in 1999 was announced, 
statements from the two senior officers spearheading transformation clearly point to an 
evolving security situation as a factor prompting change. Lastly, although the Army was 
geared toward large scale, high-intensity conflict, its recent history had demonstrated that 
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smaller scale conflicts and interventions were more likely in the future. As such, both 
Shinseki and Dubik noted that a more deployable and responsive force was required that 
could meet the Army’s need to conduct full-spectrum operations.  
B. CIVILIAN INTERVENTION AND TRANSFORMATION  
The second hypothesis put forth argues that the decision to begin Army 
transformation was the result of civilian leadership that forced the service to change. In 
this case, civilian leaders such as the President of the United States, his appointed 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), or the Secretary of the Army would have to play 
instrumental roles in the Army’s decision to create the SBCT. While most civilian 
intervention is synonymous with direct or formal orders given to a service component, 
there is potential that indirect pressure may be applied to spur change.104 This section 
aims to identify evidence of direct or indirect civilian influence on the Army’s decision to 
transform. Whether or not civilian leadership was a causal factor, it is likely that Army 
transformation could not have occurred without some level of civilian support.  
When looking for evidence that transformation was the result of civilian 
intervention, the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review from May 1997 offers a 
glimpse into the DoD’s future plans and resourcing priorities only a few short years 
before the Army began transformation. Although the 1997 QDR was the first of its kind, 
it was following up on the 1991 Base Force Study and the 1993 Bottom-Up Review to 
look within the DoD to determine future strategy and force requirements.105 Complete 
with an introduction from Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, the 1997 QDR was 
collaborative effort between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. As 
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such, the QDR was published as the “overall strategic planning document,” that 
examined “America’s defense needs from 1997 to 2015.”106  
It is clear by Secretary Cohen’s introduction that he and the DoD were looking 
toward change within the department’s service components. Cohen specifically 
referenced the RMA and its potential impact on future warfighting, as well as a “need to 
prepare now for the future.”107 Further within the QDR’s third section regarding defense 
strategy, the DoD outlined a need for the services to modernize their forces. However, 
these modernization efforts were not described as force structure transformation, but 
rather re-investing in existing weapons and systems and the procurement of modernized 
replacements. 
The 1997 QDR dedicated an entire section of the report to military 
transformation. Yet, there is no mention of a requirement of the Army or any other 
service to transform its force structure. Instead section VII referenced Joint Vision 2010 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s ambiguous efforts to embrace 
“information superiority and the technological advances that will transform traditional 
warfighting via new operational concepts, organizational arrangements, and weapons 
systems.”108 Additionally, section VII details then on-going Army efforts regarding 
change by highlighting initiatives such as Force XXI and The Army After Next (AAN) 
project.109 However, the language of the reports indicates that these efforts were 
internally imposed initiatives and that the focus on transformation was the digitization of 
heavy forces as the timeline of Force XXI fielding was shortened by two years.110 
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In addition to the release of the QDR, 1997 saw the publication of the National 
Defense Panel’s Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century. Prepared 
for the Secretary of Defense, the panel’s report was prepared by a number outside 
defense experts and retired general officers. Although the panel’s report was not prepared 
by the DoD, nor did it speak on behalf of the department, it is included here for a number 
of reasons. First, the panel’s work could have influenced the SECDEF or other civilian 
leaders to act. Further, the report was specifically focused on transformation and provided 
pointed recommendations regarding the direction that transformation should take 
America’s military forces. Last, a failure to heed the advice put forth in the report could 
indicate an unwillingness of the Secretary of Defense or other leaders to enact change. 
Like the QDR, the National Defense Panel (NPD) looked at the potential changes 
in the security environment and the United States military posture. However, the panel 
argued that while America’s military forces were suited to then current threats, the 
military would be poorly prepared for the future.111 While the Secretary’s message at the 
outset of the QDR noted a need to prepare for the future, the NDP argued that the DoD 
should go further by actually according “the highest priority to executing a 
transformation strategy.”112 Further, the panel placed a premium on the United States’ 
ability to project military power across the globe. As such, the panel recommended that 
the DoD undertake efforts to decrease its logistics footprint while increasing its 
operational range, speed, and mobility. In particular the panel urged that land forces gain 
expeditionary capabilities and reduce the reliance on heavy, hard to move combat 
systems.113  
If the NDP’s recommendations made any impact on Secretary Cohen in the 
immediate period after the report’s release, it does not appear that they were acted upon 
in regards to forcing the Army to change. This is not to say that the SECDEF or other 
civilian leaders did not influence the Army’s decision. One such instance of indirect 
influence from a civilian may have come from Assistant Secretary of Defense John J. 
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Hamre who said in August 1999 that “if the Army holds onto nostalgic versions of its 
grand past, it is going to atrophy and die.”114 The most telling impact of direct influence 
from the Secretary of Defense came from Secretary of the Army, Louis Caldera, who 
testified before House Armed Services Committee that “Secretary Cohen’s charge to me 
and to General Shinseki,” was “to leverage technology and transform our forces so that 
they will be more relevant and responsive to the needs of the nation in the 21st century. 
And that includes our ability to get to the hot spots faster with the right force to get the 
job done.”115  
There is further anecdotal evidence that Secretary Cohen may have ordered the 
Army to transform in light of the slow and problem-filled deployment of Task Force 
Hawk to Kosovo earlier in 1999.116 Had Cohen ordered the Army to change because of a 
well-publicized unfavorable incident, such a decision is consistent with one of Posen’s 
causes of innovation that states “disasters fresh in a state’s memory are great promoters 
of civilian intervention, even if no immediate threat appears on the horizon.”117 The 
failure of Task Force Hawk as an influence on the SECDEF may explain why 
transformation was not pursued at an earlier time when the QDR and the NDP identified 
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a need. However, the impact of civilian intervention on the Army’s transformation effort 
likely transcended one single decision or statement by any single civilian leader. 
Secretary Caldera’s testimony and Assistant Secretary Hamre’s statement are the 
only concrete pieces of evidence that were uncovered supporting civilian intervention 
into the Army’s decision to transform. Events and analysis that took place after those 
statements cast a shadow of doubt regarding the intensity of civilian intervention. This is 
especially true regarding the funding required for the Army to change. Secretary Cohen 
had the ability to force the Army to restructure its budget, or to provide additional funds 
from within the DoD budget that would support transformation. However, it appears that 
Cohen was unwilling to force the Army to focus spending on transformation as he did not 
demand the funding termination of underperforming or unneeded combat systems. 
Further, Cohen did not restructure the DoD budget to assist the Army’s effort; instead the 
Army was forced to fund transformation efforts while paying for the service’s day to day 
operating costs.118 
It is clear that there was some level of civilian influence regarding the Army’s 
decision to transform. However, it is unclear how much civilian leaders pressured the 
Army to do so. Perhaps most telling is that there are very few primary sources that 
indicate that civilian leaders from outside the Army impacted change. The implication 
here is that a lack of sources indicates a lack of robust influence. Further, if 
transformation was being pushed upon the Army it is likely that the DoD would have 
spurred this change by providing funds or forcing the service to spend differently.  
Finally, military transformation can be considered an important and difficult 
undertaking. As Chapter IV will demonstrate, the Bush Administration and Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld pursued transformation in a more aggressive manner. As such, 
a budget was specifically established for transformation and a “transformation Czar,” was 
appointed in 2001.119 Despite the clear indications put forth in the QDR and in the NDP’s 
report that change was necessary, and the direct and indirect influences on the Army to 
                                                 
118 Jaffe, “Army Scrambles for Funds as it Pursues Modernization”; Adams, The Army After Next, 92.  
119 Hans Binnendijk, “Introduction,” in Transforming America’s Military, ed. Hans Binnendijk 
(Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), xix.  
 44 
transform, no measures like those taken by Rumsfeld were called for by Cohen or any 
other civilian leaders. While civilian intervention influenced the Army’s decision to 
transform, the evidence suggests that it was not the only or driving force behind it.   
C. TRANSFORMATION: CHANGE FROM WITHIN 
This section will examine this Chapter’s third hypothesis that asserts that the 
Army’s decision to begin transformation and create the SBCT was largely the result of 
innovative thinking from the Army’s top uniformed and civilian leaders and their staffs. 
To do so, this section will seek to demonstrate that evidence exists that is consistent with 
Stephen Peter Rosen’s argument that “peacetime military innovation occurs when 
respected senior military officers formulate a strategy for innovation, which has both 
intellectual and organizational components.”120 Further, because Rosen also indicates 
that change that originates from within an organization is often a timely process, this 
section will examine some of the Army’s pre-transformational efforts to change.121 
In a period that exceeded just over two years, the Army tested and selected a new 
combat vehicle, as well as developed doctrine and training programs allowing it to 
quickly transform a legacy brigade to a SBCT. The Army’s ability to rapidly execute 
such a decision may have ultimately been the result of the will and innovation of top 
uniformed and civilian leaders from within the organization, but there is evidence that 
previous efforts to re-examine capabilities and force structure assisted transformation and 
its associated concepts. One such effort, the High Tech Light Division (HTLD) from the 
early 1980s sought to leverage technology to improve the lethality and mobility of the 
Army’s light infantry forces.122 Although the Army’s experimental force, the 9th ID, was 
unable to successfully harness technology in a meaningful way that influenced force 
structure changes prior to 1999’s transformation, there was some benefit. As such, both 
Shinseki and Dubik referenced the 9th Infantry experiment as both a lesson on how not to 
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go about transformation, but also as a valuable effort because the Army was able to 
capitalize upon some of the concepts and ideas many years after the fact.123    
In the aftermath of the HTLD experiments of the 1980s and the success of the 
1991 Gulf War, the Army continued to pursue new ways to improve the organization. 
The impetus for pre-transformational Army change appears to have originated from 
General Gordon R. Sullivan.124 Sullivan, while serving as the Army Chief of Staff 
initiated the Army’s modern Louisiana maneuvers, which sought to conduct experiments 
and simulations “to test proposed doctrine, procedures, organizations, and equipment.”125 
From these computer-simulated, virtual maneuvers grew the two most noteworthy 
innovative efforts, the development of Force XXI and the Army After Next project. 
As an output of Sullivan’s “new strategic vision,” Force XXI sought to leverage 
newly emerging information technologies into the Army’s pre-existing force structure.126 
At its core, Force XXI centered on the development and use of the tactical internet to 
digitize the Army’s heavy formations. To do so, experimentation efforts began in 1993, 
and by 1996 the 4th Infantry Division was designated as the Army’s experimental force. 
While the infusion of technology was the overarching goal of Force XXI, the Army did 
alter the 4th ID’s force structure slightly.127 In addition, experimentation sought to 
develop new concepts, identify potential organizational design changes, as well as 
determine the optimal employment methods for digitized forces.128 
While Force XXI sought to digitize the Army’s heavy forces, the Army After 
Next project, which was initiated in 1996, was aimed toward developing the total force 
                                                 
123 Public Broadcasting Service, The Future of War, “Interview: General Eric K. Shinseki;” Public 
Broadcasting Service, The Future of War, “Interview: Major General James Dubik.”  
124 General Sullivan served as the Army Chief of Staff from June 1991 to June 1995. 
125 James L. Yarrison, The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers (Washington, DC: United States Army 
Center of Military History, 1999), iv. 
126 Mark J. Reardon and Jeffery A. Charlston, From Transformation to Combat: The First Stryker 
Brigade at War (Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2007), 1.  
127 Reardon and Charlston , From Transformation to Combat, 1, note that although the 4th ID was 
slightly smaller in total number of assigned personnel, the division had more infantry units and fire–support 
systems, as well as increased reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities. 
128 Thomas R. Goedkoop and Barry E. Venable, “Task Force XXI: An Overview,” Military Review 
79, no. 2 (May/June 1999), 71. 
 46 
for the challenges of the future. Spurred by General Dennis J. Reimer, Sullivan’s 
successor as Army Chief of Staff, the AAN project sought to “explore new concepts and 
capabilities;” this included a number of potential future force structures.129 While the 
AAN project was largely conceptual in nature, its roots did not stray far from the 
development of Force XXI as the AAN was focused heavily upon the increased use of 
information technologies.130 The true potential and vision that Reimer had for the AAN 
project, however, was not to be known, as his successor, Shinseki would outline a new 
vision of transformation shortly after assuming his post as Army Chief of Staff.   
There is little doubt that the Army moved very rapidly after Shinseki announced 
his decision to begin Army transformation. Although such speed runs contrary to Rosen’s 
assertion that change from within an organization is usually a slow endeavor, the Army’s 
ability to transform quickly may be traced to the previous efforts indentified above. Both 
Shinseki and Dubik mentioned the failed experimentation attempt of the 9th ID in the 
1980s as a valuable lesson from which the Army could learn from moving forward. 
Further, Dubik mentioned the Louisiana Maneuver Task Force, a number of war-fighting 
experiments from 1994 to 1998, and the 4th ID’s development of Force XXI as initiatives 
that the Army leveraged to develop the SBCT and the Objective Force.131  
When looking for evidence that innovative thinking from within the Army was 
the catalyst spurring transformation it is important to understand why the senior officers 
leading the change pursued a new direction, as well as the strategy that they pursued to 
enact the decision. In numerous appearances before Congress, Shinseki outlined the need 
for transformation. First and foremost, he cited a need for the Army to transform “to 
better meet current and future strategic requirements.”132 While many of these 
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requirements were the result of a changed security environment, a number also resided 
within the roles and missions that the Army could expect to execute as outlined earlier in 
this Chapter. In regards to the creation of the SBCT, Shinseki routinely argued the 
Army’s need for a combat ready brigade-sized force that could deploy anywhere in world 
within 96 hours which could operate across the full-spectrum of military operations.133 
The need to change may have been based in large part to the security environment 
and the Army’s expected roles and missions, but such a need was nothing new. Much like 
Shinseki’s rationale for transformation, Reimer’s AAN project was based on need to get 
faster and more powerful.134 Yet one of the many differences between the AAN and 
Shinseki’s transformation initiative was that Shinseki had a clear strategy for 
transformation while the AAN was based solely in concept. By outlining the 
transformation along three pathways: the legacy, interim (SBCT), and objective forces, 
Shinseki’s strategy sought to focus on the medium term with the SBCT, the future by 
experimentation with the objective force, and the then current term by retaining the 
legacy force to act as a hedge against potential failures.135  
The Army’s transformation strategy did not start and stop with the creation or 
retention of military units, but also sought to change doctrine and leader development. 
The creation of the SBCT was significant in that it was a new unit type with a new 
combat platform, but also in that it was the Army’s test bed for doctrine and training 
development. Major General Dubik asserted that the organizational change and vehicle 
development and fielding were the easy parts, and that doctrine, training, and leader 
development were the more difficult tasks associated with transformation.136 The 
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inclusion of intellectual components within the SBCT’s creation highlights the 
forethought and robustness of Shinseki’s strategy. 
Although Shinseki did not wish to receive credit for his decision to begin 
transformation and create the SBCT, he has been identified as one of, if not the greatest 
influence regarding the change. Dubik cited Shinseki’s vision and his desire to enact 
transformation in regards to the Army’s ability to move as quickly as it did.137  
Shinseki himself understood that his opportunity was unprecedented during a time of 
peace, and that his time to influence transformation would only last the four years he was 
allowed to serve as Army Chief of Staff.138 Perhaps it was the specter of a fleeting 
opportunity that motivated him to force the Army to change as rapidly as it did.   
The evidence that points toward change from within the Army as the driver 
behind the decision to begin transformation stems from innovation and leadership from 
Shinseki and Dubik. However, because the Army could be expected to anticipate changes 
in the security environment and should be responsive to its external civilian leadership, it 
is unlikely that such a decision to transform is without any external influence. Further, 
even if the creation of the SBCT was the result of innovative thinking and the leadership 
of top Army officers, there were a number of previous attempts from which lessons and 
analysis could be drawn from. This is not to downplay the role that many Army leaders, 
but to highlight that there are many factors that could influence such an important 
decision.  
Clearly, the security environment was a major factor behind Shinseki’s decision. 
Further, the many previous innovation efforts and experiments provided lessons and 
analysis that the Army could draw upon. However, Shinseki’s transformation vision had 
a clear strategy that not only included structural changes to the Army’s organization but 
also intellectual changes as well. In sum, the evidence suggests the Army’s decision to 
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transform can be attributed to change from within the organization itself in a manner that 
is consistent with Rosen’s argument regarding military innovation.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to investigate three hypotheses that may explain why the 
Army began a transformation initiative in 1999. The first hypothesis argued that the 
decision to transform was based upon changes to the security environment and the 
Army’s anticipated roles and missions. The second hypothesis was rooted in the belief 
that the decision was forced upon the Army by its civilian leaders. The third hypothesis 
suggests that the Army’s decision was based within innovative leadership from within the 
service that spurred the change. The evidence gathered in this chapter suggests that each 
hypothesis can explain the Army’s decision to a certain degree.  
The hypothesis with the strongest case is the first, which assigns causality for the 
Army’s decision on a changed security environment and the service’s expected roles and 
missions. The Cold War’s end coupled with little to no force structure changes, and the 
frequency of conflict on the lower scale of intensity made it necessary for the Army to 
develop a full-spectrum force such as the SBCT. However, the changes to the security 
environment and the Army’s roles and missions did not occur just prior to General 
Shinseki’s appointment as Army chief of staff. As such, the third hypothesis also makes a 
strong case because there were demonstrated efforts to change prior to the transformation 
announcement that support a longer period of time needed to transform from within, as 
well as a clear strategy that included organizational change and intellectual components. 
There is evidence that the second hypothesis factored into the Army’s decision as it was 
stated that Secretary of Defense Cohen directed General Shinseki and Secretary Caldera 
to make changes. However, because there is a lack of sources that document pertinent 
factors such as the time frame that such changes should be executed within, as well as 
evidence that the Secretary of Defense did not restructure the DoD’s budget or force the 
Army to make spending changes, it is unknown how big a role civilian intervention had 
on the Army’s decision.  
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While a changed security environment and the Army’s expected roles and 
missions likely had the greatest impact on transformation, and change from within the 
Army is a close second, the answer may be found in combination of the two hypotheses. 
The need to change was clearly documented in the 1997 QDR as well as within Joint 
Vision 2010, and the NDP’s report. Both Shinseki and Dubik cite the changed security 
environment and the Army’s expanded roles and missions as drivers of change, however, 
such a change could not have occurred without Shinseki’s decision in the first place. 
Further, the Army’s plan for transformation was well thought-out and based upon years 
of experimentation and analysis. The clear transformation strategy, rapidness of 
execution and subsequent success of the SBCT in combat all point to the likeliness that 
innovative thinkers within the Army had a preeminent role in transformation.  
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IV. CASE STUDY: DECISION TO CREATE A BRIGADE-
CENTRIC ARMY 
Shortly after his appointment in 2003 to replace General Shinseki as Army Chief 
of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker reaffirmed the Army’s commitment to 
transformation. While Schoomaker’s vision for transformation built upon the work of his 
predecessor in many ways, Schoomaker increased the scope of change to encompass 
some 17 focus areas, of which, the modularization of brigade combat teams (BCT) 
became the decisive effort.139 Like the Army’s initial efforts toward modularization, this 
chapter is chiefly concerned with the creation of the BCT. However, because modularity 
sought to change the Army’s entire force structure, related changes to units above the 
BCT and to the various support brigades will be discussed as they relate to transformation 
and modularization within the larger scope of change.  
This chapter seeks to examine the Army’s decision to focus its transformation 
efforts on the modular BCT concept through three hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
suggests that the decision was based upon a changed or changing security environment or 
to changes in the Army’s roles and missions. The second hypothesis argues that the 
Army’s decision to modularize was forced by its civilian leadership. The third hypothesis 
contends that the Army’s decision was the result of change from within through 
innovative thinking and leadership.  
To investigate the three hypotheses, this chapter is mainly concerned with the 
time period following the Army’s decision to create the SBCT through the first few years 
of the Army’s modularization effort. This time frame is notable for a number of reasons 
that will be discussed throughout the chapter to include the changing of presidential 
administrations, the appointment of a new Secretary of Defense and Army Chief of Staff, 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the subsequent military operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. This chapter uses a number of primary and secondary sources to 
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achieve its findings. Chief among these are the Quadrennial Defense Review (s) from 
2001 and 2006 (hereby known as the 2001 QDR and the 2006 QDR), The National 
Defense Strategy of the United States of America from 2005, the DoD’s 2003 
Transformation Planning Guidance, the Army’s 2003 and 2004 Transformation 
Roadmaps and the 2004 Army Posture Statement. In doing so, this chapter finds that there 
is evidence that elements from each hypothesis were present in the Army’s decision, but 
that the cause is likely found within civilian intervention forcing change.   
A. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND MODULARITY 
The first hypothesis regarding the decision to create modular BCTs argues that the 
Army’s decision was a response to a changed or changing security environment and/or to 
changed or changing service roles and missions. To prove or disprove this hypothesis it is 
important to first understand the nature of the security environment of the time, and what 
was predicted for the future. By late 2003, when modularization became the centerpiece 
of the Army’s transformation, the relative peace associated with the post-Cold War world 
had been shattered. First and foremost, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 spurred the United 
States into military operations in Afghanistan and set America on a Global War on Terror 
(GWOT). The subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003 under the auspices of the GWOT 
further entrenched the United States in war. This wartime condition signified the most 
dramatic change of the security environment and its impact permeates the remainder of 
this section. 
In the time period between September 2001 and Schoomaker’s decision to create 
the modular BCT, there were many perceptions about the security environment. Largely 
the result of the attacks of 9/11, the threat from non-state actors in the form of terrorism 
appeared as one of the most prominent characteristics of the security environment that the 
United States was confronting and one that America could expect to confront in the 
future.140 The elevation of terrorism as a major component in the security environment 
was highlighted in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America from 
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September 2002 that indicated that terrorism was the main threat and enemy confronting 
the United States.141 While terrorism was the catalyst for war in Afghanistan, and one of 
the reasons for the invasion of Iraq, there were other characteristics of the security 
environment that could have influenced the Army’s decision. 
Much like the post-Cold War period, the predictions and perceptions of the post-
9/11 period’s security environment underscored the decreased likeness of traditional 
state-on-state conflict and highlighted the uncertainty of the future.142 Such uncertainty 
was rooted in the inability to predict the source or capabilities of potential adversaries 
amongst a wide array of actors to include traditional states, non-state actors, and criminal 
networks. Additionally, there was an uncertainty where future conflicts would arise, and 
where the United States could potentially employ military forces across a wide spectrum 
of terrain and geography. Underlying this uncertainty was the perception that potential 
adversaries would continue to employ asymmetric means to counter American 
advantages in military capabilities. Further, the United States believed that some 
adversaries (states or non-state actors) were attempting to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction (a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon) that could be used in America or 
against one of its allies.143  
The perceived uncertain and dangerous security environment had an immense 
impact on the United States and the Department of Defense during the period that the 
modular BCT concept was conceived and implemented. This was evident by the 
development and implementation of new National Security, Defense, and Military 
strategies that appeared after 9/11. Although two of these documents were released after 
the Army’s decision to create the modular BCT, all three documents maintained a 
constant theme indicating that the strategic environment was a driving force behind 
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military transformation.144 Additionally, the DoD’s Transformation Planning Guidance, 
from April 2003 and Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach published in the Fall 
of 2003 both stress the importance of a changed and changing the security environment 
as a catalyst for change.145  
Since the three national strategies referenced above and the two pertinent DoD 
transformation documents all indicate that the security environment was the main driver 
of post-9/11 military transformation, it is useful to connect the Army’s decision to 
modularize the force into the greater transformation initiative. The DoD’s 
Transformation Planning Guidance, outlined the scope and strategy of transformation. 
Within the scope of transformation, the planning guidance required the services to 
transform how they would fight to include changing organizational designs.146 Perhaps 
more importantly, one of the pillars of the planning guidance’s strategy was the change of 
military capabilities through force transformation. While this component of the 
transformation strategy highlighted the role that technological advances would likely 
have in regard to information technology and precision-strike capabilities, force 
transformation also called for the creation of standing joint force headquarters as well as 
the need for combined arms forces.147 Within the Army’s modular force construct, the 
Unit of Employment (echelons above the brigade, chiefly the division and corps) was 
designed to meet the need of a joint force headquarters, while the BCT became the 
combat arms force of choice.148      
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Linking the Army’s decision to focus transformation on the modular force design 
within the DoD’s broader transformation initiative does not necessarily indicate that the 
Army found the strategic environment as a motivation for change. The DoD 
transformation initiative to Army modularization link could indicate that the Army was 
simply following guidance from its higher authority. However, there is evidence that the 
security environment was a driving force behind the Army’s decision. Descriptions and 
perceptions of the security environment found in the Army’s 2003 and 2004 
Transformation Roadmaps and in the 2004 Army Posture Statement echo those found in 
the 2001 QDR and the national strategies discussed above. As such, these Army 
documents point to an environment fraught with uncertainty, asymmetry and the threat of 
terrorism.149 While the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap stated that the conversion 
of the Army’s fighting force to the modular BCT construct was the decisive operation in 
regards to the service’s transformation efforts, its reason for doing so were tied to “the 
new strategic context and the lessons learned in three years of war.”150 
The 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap’s mention of war as a catalyst for 
change is important because it tied the nature of the security environment to the Army’s 
roles and missions. Although the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan did not alter 
the Army’s primary mission to provide land forces that could fight and win the nation’s 
wars, the events of 9/11 resulted in increased requirements for the Army (both active and 
reserve components) to support homeland defense operations.151 In addition to homeland 
defense operations and combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army continued 
to provide forces to support operations in the Balkans and in the Sinai, as well as 
maintain forward stationed units in Germany, and the Republic of Korea.152 The 
significance of these operations and of the force posture is that by the end of fiscal year 
2003, the Army had mobilized over 164,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen, 
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deployed nearly two-thirds of its combat formations (both active and reserve component), 
and had more than 325,000 soldiers employed overseas.153 
The high percentage of deployed combat units and soldiers serving overseas was a 
reflection of the Army’s evolving roles and missions. While the service continued to 
execute enduring operations such as the forward stationing of forces in Korea, the combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan signaled a movement toward a more expeditionary 
focus as part of the GWOT. Such an expeditionary focus was not however tied to a 
timeline that required a rapid termination of combat operations. For its part in the 
GWOT, the Army contended that such operations would require the sustainment of its 
expeditionary forces and capabilities over a long duration.154 The need to sustain and 
generate combat forces of an expeditionary nature in response to the Army’s changing 
roles and missions can be seen as one possible motive to focus transformation on the 
modularization of BCTs. 
The conversion of the Army’s conventional fighting forces into the modular 
BCT concept provided many of the resources that the service and the DoD required. By 
placing additional sustainment capabilities and organic reconnaissance, and field 
artillery battalions within the modular construct, the Army believed that the BCT would 
be a self-sustaining organization more capable to conduct expeditionary operations.155 
Further, the standardization of all of the Army’s conventional fighting forces at the 
brigade level could increase deployability as BCTs would not require the support from 
echelons above brigade (mainly the Army’s division and corps level sustainment and 
artillery units) to achieve the task-organization needed for the unit to carry out its 
wartime missions.156 Not only would the modular BCT make it easier to deploy force 
because the need to task organize was removed, but when compared with the pre-
modular designs, the BCT could be deploy more quickly as these units could load more 
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combat power on a decreased number of required strategic transportation assets such as 
C-17 aircraft and Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off Ships.157 
In addition to the increased expeditionary capabilities and deployability that 
modularization could produce, doing so would also increase the number of available 
conventional combat units. The pre-modular Army numbered some thirty-three Active 
and thirty-six National Guard combat brigades. One of Schoomaker’s objectives of 
modularity was to increase the number of deployable brigades to between seventy-seven 
and eight-one BCTs. This increase of up to twelve brigades was to be done by only 
increasing the Army’s end strength by some 30,000 active-duty soldiers.158 Such an 
increase was desired to reduce the strains of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
placed on units, soldiers, and leaders by increasing the time between deployments and 
allowing crucial reset, training, and preparation activities before being recommitted.159 
Considering that the strains of combat operations were visible after only two plus years in 
Afghanistan and less than one year in Iraq, and that Schoomaker sought the growth of 
BCTs through minimal end strength growth, it is clear that the increased roles and 
missions that the Army was conducting during a time of increased operational tempo 
played a role in the Army’s decision to modularize the force. 
A changed or changing security environment and changes to the roles and 
missions appears to have spurred the Army’s decision to move from a division-centric 
force to a force that relied on the modular BCT as its primary combat formation. There is 
no question that the security environment impacted the United States as a driver of 
broader military transformation. Similarly, the security environment was noted as a driver 
of Army transformation, of which modularization became the primary focal point. This 
was demonstrated most clearly in the 2004 Army Posture Statement that plainly states the 
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“strategic environment—our mandate for transformation.”160 Further, the Army’s 
expanded roles and missions, most apparent in the GWOT and in operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq appeared as source of change. Finally, the conversion to modular 
BCTs promoted increased expeditionary capabilities and deployability while growing the 
numbers of available forces through a minimal increase of the Army’s active duty end 
strength.  
B. CIVILIAN INTERVENTION AND MODULARITY 
The second hypothesis concerning the decision to modularize the force argues 
that the Army responded to the desires of civilian leaders that were forcing the service to 
change. For this to occur, the nation’s top civilian leadership concerned with military 
matters such as the president of the United States or his appointed secretary of defense 
would be expected to play crucial roles in the Army’s decision to focus transformation 
efforts on modularization. This hypothesis is applicable to the post-9/11 American 
military situation and is constant with Barry Posen’s balance of power innovation theory 
where civilian intervention is likely to induce change when war is likely or underway.161 
To identify evidence linking civilian intervention to the Army’s focal transformation 
effort, this section will examine a number of documents originating from the White 
House and the DoD, as well as speeches from America’s civilian leadership.  
In the time period between the Army’s decision to create the SBCT in 1999, and 
the 2003 effort to focus transformation on modularization, a number of changes in the 
domestic political arena had occurred. Most notable was the election of President George 
W. Bush in 2000, and his subsequent appointment of Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of 
defense. Beginning with the 2001 inauguration, both Bush and Rumsfeld would occupy 
their offices while the Army developed and initially implemented its modularization 
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strategy.162 According to Rumsfeld, the notion of wide-spread military transformation 
was on the Bush Administration’s agenda prior to coming to power.163   
It did not take long for the president’s transformation initiatives to take hold 
within the DoD. Immediately upon assuming office, Secretary Rumsfeld began the task 
of transforming the military, although not all of the themes and direction that 
transformation would take originated from the secretary.164 The first manifestation of 
transformation initiatives appeared in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
which was issued only two weeks after the events of 9/11.165 While the 2001 QDR was 
notable because it articulated changes to the nation’s defense strategy, force planning 
focus, and global military posture, but more importantly for transformation, the document 
dedicated an entire nineteen page Chapter on changing the military.166 Although the 
mention of a need for military change was present in the previous QDR from 1997, the 
2001 QDR differed in that it identified operational goals tied to the transformation 
effort.167 Further, the report made specific mention of the need for military forces that 
must be modular and more deployable.168 
Although the 2001 QDR drew a connection between the strategic environment as 
a driver of change, implied in the report was a need to spur the military services to 
change. Within the 2001 QDR was mention of the establishment of the Office of Force 
Transformation, whose director, Arthur Cebrowski reported directly to the SECDEF to 
“evaluate the transformation efforts of the Military Departments and promote synergy by 
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recommending steps to integrate ongoing transformation activities.”169 The establishment 
of the Office of Force Transformation and the appointment of a director of transformation 
indicates that military change would be driven from the senior civilian leadership within 
the Pentagon. Further evidence of civilian intervention proceeded in short order with the 
release of DoD transformation documents released in 2003. 
The first document to focus solely on change was the DoD’s Transformation 
Planning Guidance, from April 2003.170 Starting with a foreword from Secretary 
Rumsfeld, the document outlined the department’s approach and strategy for 
transformation.171 Further the guidance assigned roles and responsibilities for senior 
civilian and uniformed leaders of the DoD and the service components. Although the 
document demonstrated an attempt to approach transformation through a collaborative 
effort between DoD and military service leaders, it appears that Secretary Rumsfeld was 
the ultimate authority. As such, the planning document stated that the SECDEF would 
have “the final approval authority on all major elements of the transformation strategy,” 
as well as establish the “policies and objectives,” regarding transformation.172  
Additional evidence that indicates that transformation was driven by civilian 
intervention is found in a number of strategic documents that span the period from 2002 
through 2005. Released in 2002, The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America (NSS) was the first in a series of documents to outline tenets of the new strategy 
set forth by the Bush Administration and the DoD. Although the document cut a broad 
swath through security issues facing America and new ways to confront them, 
transformation was deemed important as a section of the strategy was dedicated to the 
issue. While the scope of the strategy in regards to transformation was concerned with all 
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of America’s national security institutions, specific mention of military transformation to 
include expeditionary maneuver forces were included in the document.173   
Following the 2002 NSS, the DoD released The National Military Strategy of the 
United States of America (NMS) of 2004, and The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 
2005.174 While the NMS originated from the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, its discussion of change focused broadly on achieving full spectrum dominance 
within the DoD’s (i.e., civilian leaders) greater transformation goals in support of the 
NDS that would appear one year later.175 The NDS for its part was focused on the four 
strategic objectives for the DoD in support of the president’s NSS. However, the NDS 
specifically mentioned a need to continuously transform, especially to achieve the force 
capabilities that the DoD would need to meet its strategic objectives.176 
A constant theme running through the 2001 QDR and the strategies discussed 
above is a need to transform the military. Since the NSS originated from President Bush, 
and the NDS from Secretary Rumsfeld, one can trace the origin of transformation to these 
civilian leaders. Additionally, the 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance, delineated 
roles and responsibilities regarding change. As the SECDEF, Rumsfeld had the final say 
regarding transformation decisions, and the direction transformation would take. Further 
making a case for civilian intervention was the Director of Force Transformation, Arthur 
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president and the secretary of defense,” as they “have elevated transformation to the level 
of national strategy, national military strategy, corporate strategy and risk management 
strategy.”177    
Cebrowski’s assertion is substantiated by remarks made by both the president and 
the SECDEF. President Bush remarked in a December, 2001 speech that he foresaw a 
need to transform the military before 9/11. However, the terrorist attacks appeared to 
have elevated and increased the tempo of military change as the president set military 
transformation as the nation’s top enduring priority.178 This sentiment was echoed by 
Secretary Rumsfeld who stated that his orders from the outset by the president included 
the establishment of a new defense strategy that included transformation to make 
America’s military lighter, more mobile, and lethal.179 
It is clear that America’s top civilian leaders drove transformation, thus making a 
strong case for civilian intervention regarding the Army’s decision to focus efforts on the 
modular BCT. As the Army’s decision would enact modularity across the service’s entire 
conventional fighting force, doing so would bring about the modularity called for by the 
2001 QDR. As discussed earlier, the modular BCT was perceived to be more deployable 
and expeditionary. These characteristics were consistent with the requirements to make 
the military more mobile and lethal as set forth by the president and acted upon by the 
SECDEF. While it is conceivable that the Army made its decision to develop a modular 
capability without civilian intervention, the overwhelming number of documents and 
statements above related to or mentioning transformation and the indications that military 
change was proceeding from the highest levels of American government make such a 
possibility remote.   
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C. CHANGE FROM WITHIN AND INNOVATIVE THINKING 
The third hypothesis asserts that the Army’s decision to focus transformation 
efforts on the modular BCT concept was the result of innovative thinking from the 
Army’s top uniformed and civilian leaders and their staffs. The wartime condition under 
which the Army executed its transition to modularization is noteworthy. According to 
Stephen Peter Rosen, military organizations such as the Army would be motivated to act 
in a time of war and would have “the strongest possible incentives to learn rationally 
from its experiences.”180 It is from these experiences and others gained during the 
Army’s initial transformation effort to include the creation of the SBCT where evidence 
of change from within may be found. 
Starting with General Schoomaker’s order to the Army’s Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) in September 2003, the service would make modularization its 
transformation priority.181 By July 2004, the Army had completed the modular BCT 
design and had already converted three brigades from the 3rd Infantry Division and 
began to convert both the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Infantry Division (Air 
Assault) to the new organizational structure.182 While the Army would not complete 
modularization of its conventional combat forces until 2010, the initial phase of the 
transformation moved very quickly. The rapidness of such an endeavor was likely made 
possible by a number of initiatives dating back to the mid-1990s.    
The modular concept was not new upon Schoomaker’s appointment as Army 
Chief of Staff. Schoomaker’s predecessor, General Shinseki referenced the unit of action 
(the former term associated with the BCT) when discussing the future objective force as 
conceived during the initial stages of Army transformation.183 Further, according to 
William Donnelly’s Transforming an Army at War: Designing the Modular Force, 1991–
1995 the idea of modularity had become key characteristic that Shinseki and the Army 
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were basing all future force designs.184 Although one of modularization’s outputs was a 
decreased dependency upon the division to provide assets the brigade would need on a 
regular basis, from an organizational design standpoint, the modular BCT had many 
similarities with the SBCT.185 As Chapter III demonstrated, the creation of the SBCT 
benefited from a number of previous experiments and projects. When remarking on the 
development of the modular BCT, Lieutenant General John Curran, the deputy TRADOC 
commander responsible for the future force noted how the development of the SBCT and 
the objective force under Shinseki and the Army’s earlier attempts during the Force XXI 
experiments and Army After Next project provided the analytics that drove the modular 
design.186 
Schoomaker himself acknowledged Shinseki’s impact on transformation when he 
testified that “General Shinseki started major transformational efforts in the Army that we 
are building on today, and he deserves a great deal of credit for setting the stage for an 
awful lot of the things we are doing.”187 However, this is not to say that Schoomaker did 
not have an impact on the decision to impart modularity. For his part, Schoomaker 
appears to have attempted to place his vision on Army transformation by making subtle, 
yet important terminology changes when he renamed Shinseki’s legacy, interim, and 
objective forces to the Army’s current and future forces.188 Further, he established 
modularity as the Army’s transformational priority, and established Task Force 
Modularity as an ad hoc organization within TRADOC.189 
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While it is clear that the Army developed the modular BCT concept through an 
internal process, it is unclear if the decision to implement the design was the result of 
innovative thinking on behalf of the Army’s top leaders, or a response to the security 
environment or to civilian intervention. As this Chapter’s first section demonstrated, the 
security environment was powerful motivator for change across the DoD and within the 
Army. Schoomaker himself testified to the impact of the GWOT and the security 
environment as a factor influencing transformation and modularization.190 Further as 
section two determined, there was a great deal of influence regarding military change 
emanating from the White House and the Pentagon. However, both the perceived changes 
to the security environment and civilian pressure persisted from as early as 2001.  
The unique timing of the Army’s decision helps slightly to clear up the question at 
hand. The preponderance of evidence that suggests that Shinseki’s term as Army Chief of 
Staff existed in a time of strong civilian intervention and that modularity was an idea 
underpinning the Army’s future force developments suggests that a decision to 
modularize the force could have been made earlier than late 2003. As such, Schoomaker 
alluded to missed transformational opportunities when testifying before Congress in 
2004. However, he also pointed to increased funding resulting from the GWOT as 
catalyst to speed the transformational process.191  
Linking the wartime conditions with the modularization effort reveals a number 
of factors that may explain why the Army may have initiated the focus on its own. First, 
one of the DoD’s transformation imperatives was explicitly linked to technological 
advance.192 Yet, the Army’s decision to modularize the force was not hinged on 
technology as the BCTs would simply be reorganized around the combat platforms from 
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which they were originally designed to fight from.193 While the modular BCTs would 
eventually benefit from increased information technologies resulting from Force XXI 
initiatives (chiefly the ability of tactical units to communicate via the tactical internet 
through blue force tracking systems) the Army would be able to quickly transform from 
the old brigade construct to the new modular BCT design as part of reset activities for 
units returning from deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.194 Thus the Army was able to 
conduct its priority transformation effort while maintaining combat power in its 
operational theaters.     
The modularization effort also provided the Army with a force structure that 
would benefit from the standardization of three distinct types of BCTs (heavy, infantry, 
and Stryker). As discussed earlier, the inclusion of elements formally found at the 
division and corps levels into the BCT could improve deployability and expeditionary 
capabilities. Perhaps more importantly for Schoomaker and the Army in 2003 was that 
modularization would seemingly grow the Army’s pool of available combat forces with a 
relatively small increase in service end strength. As the 2004 Army Posture Statement 
noted, deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq were causing existing stressors to be of a 
greater concern even though the Iraqi campaign had been underway for a little more than 
a year.195 Considering that the Army expected a future of foreseeable conflict, 
modularization could reduce stress on the force by building a sustainable rotational 
schedule for deployments with the additional brigades that modularization would 
produce.196  
The evidence that points toward change from within the Army as the primary 
factor behind the Army’s decision to focus its transformation effort on modularity is 
based largely on the chronology of the decision in light of the indications that the security 
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environment and civilian intervention were also likely causal factors. The Army’s prior 
transformational endeavors made the option of modularization feasible for Shinseki, yet 
no such decision was made before Schoomaker’s appointment as Army Chief of Staff. 
While Schoomaker benefited from prior efforts, he did ultimately decide to focus 
transformation on modularity. However, the benefits of modularization can be seen as a 
solution for a growing problem associated with an open-ended war that was taxing the 
Army’s conventional combat forces. While it is possible that the Army’s decision to 
focus transformation efforts on modularization was a result of change from within, if it 
did, it was likely doing so with the understanding of security environment’s impact and 
the clear indications that America’s civilian leaders were demanding change. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to examine the Army’s decision to focus its transformation 
efforts on the modular BCT concept through three hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
argued that the decision was based upon a changed or changing security environment or 
to changes in the Army’s roles and missions. The second hypothesis suggested that the 
decision was forced upon the Army by its civilian leadership. The third hypothesis was 
rooted in the belief that the Army’s decision was the result of change from within through 
innovative thinking and leadership. While each hypothesis uncovered evidence that can 
explain the Army’s decision, they do so with varying degrees of strength. 
The hypothesis with the strongest case is the second, which advocates that civilian 
intervention was the causal force behind the Army’s transformational focus on 
modularity. The 2001 QDR, DoD transformation documents, and the three national 
strategies developed by the Bush Administration and Secretary Rumsfeld in the Pentagon 
demonstrate that military transformation was being driven in a top-down approach. 
However, it is clear that the reason for doing so was closely linked to the security 
environment. As such, the first hypothesis that argues that the changed or changing 
security environment and by extension, the Army’s changed roles and missions, makes 
the second strongest case. The third hypothesis suggesting that the Army’s decision was 
rooted from within through innovative leadership and thinking makes the weakest case. 
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While the timing of the decision offered scant evidence that General Schoomaker could 
have been the driving force, the significance that the Army placed upon the security 
environment within its own transformation documents indicates that other factors were 
likely driving the decision. 
While the evidence suggests that civilian intervention had the greatest impact on 
the Army’s decision to focus transformation efforts on the modular BCT, and the impact 
of the security environment is a close second, it is difficult to separate the two hypotheses 
due to their connected nature. There are clear indications that civilian leaders made 
military transformation a high priority, and as such, the Army’s decision to modularize 
can be seen as a response to satisfy its higher authorities. However, much of the rationale 
regarding the impetus to change was rooted in a changed or changing security 
environment. The most complete answer may be found in the combination of the two 
hypotheses. The combination thus suggests that the Army’s decision was both a response 
to its civilian leaders that desired change, and to the changed security environment that 
was influencing both the civilian leaders and the Army.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
Beginning with General Eric Shinseki’s announcement in 1999, the Army 
pursued a transformation effort that would span over a decade. Shinseki’s vision sought 
to change the Army for the future through an approach centered on three distinct paths. 
The service was to retain much of its conventional fighting forces that were designated as 
legacy units. Looking toward the future, the Army began to experiment with force design 
and technological solutions for the objective force. To bridge the gap between the legacy 
and objective forces, Shinseki’s vision created the interim brigade combat team (re-
designated the SBCT). Upon Shinseki’s retirement, and the appointment of his successor, 
General Peter Schoomaker, the focus of transformation shifted. While the pursuit of the 
objective force (re-designated the future force by Schoomaker) would remain, the Army 
would designate the modularization of its conventional forces as its decisive 
transformational effort. By reallocating force structure elements formally found at the 
division and corps level to the modular BCT, the Army shifted focus from the division to 
the brigade. 
By 2010, a number of transformation milestones had occurred. First, the SBCT 
concept had been fully developed, implemented, and deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan a 
number of times. Second, the modularization process had been completed, and in the 
process the Army gained twelve BCTs. Third, the future combat system (FCS) program 
was cancelled. Since the FCS was to provide the combat platforms that the future force 
would operate from, its cancellation signaled the end of the Army’s transformational 
efforts toward the future force. While the goal of Army transformation in relation to the 
service’s force structure sought to build the future force, even with a budget of 
$160 billion, the future force would not come to fruition.197 What was left, however, was 
an Army that would operate through the modular force concept, where the BCT (infantry, 
heavy, and Stryker) became the primary conventional force building block.     
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This thesis sought to determine the driving factors behind the Army’s decisions 
that resulted first, in the creation of the SBCT, and later, in the transformational focus to 
the modular BCT. To do so, these two decisions were examined through three hypotheses 
that were based on military innovation theories put forth by Stephen Peter Rosen, 
Deborah Avant, Barry Posen, and others. The first hypothesis contended that either 
decision could have been the response to a changed or changing security environment or 
to changes to the Army’s roles and missions. The second hypothesis argued that the 
Army may have acted because it was forced to by its civilian leaders. The final 
hypothesis suggested that the creation of the SBCT or the focus on modularization 
resulted from innovative thinking or leadership that originated from the Army’s top 
uniformed or civilian leaders.    
A. FINDINGS 
As the two case studies that examined the creation of the SBCT and the modular 
BCT demonstrated, there was evidence that elements of each hypothesis were present in 
both decisions. In the case studied in Chapter III regarding the SBCTs creation, causal 
responsibility was most strongly associated with the changed and changing security 
environment and in the Army’s changed or changing roles and missions. There was also 
evidence of a great deal of innovative thinking and strong leadership from the Army’s 
senior uniformed leader, General Shinseki. Additionally, there was evidence that 
suggested some civilian intervention, but to a lesser extent than the other possible 
explanations. In the case of the Army’s change in transformation focus to the modular 
concept, it appeared that civilian intervention was the driving factor behind the decision. 
However, since the security environment was mentioned as a catalyst for change by the 
very civilians demanding transformation, by Army in its own publications, this 
explanation is nearly as strong. Finally, while there was limited evidence that pointed to 
change originating from the Army’s senior leaders, this hypothesis appeared weaker than 
the others in comparison.    
When looking at the time period that covered both the creation of the SBCT and 
the modular force, the common theme running through both decisions was that a strong 
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case for causal responsibility could be made for the changed or changing security 
environment and/or changed or changing roles and mission. This finding is constant with 
Deborah Avant’s international theory that asserts that military innovation should occur as 
a reaction to external dangers associated with the security environment.198 However, in 
both cases, a second hypothesis was also closely associated with the decision under 
examination. In regards to the creation to the SBCT, strong evidence of change from 
within appeared in a manner constant with Stephen Peter Rosen’s claim that “peacetime 
military innovation occurs when respected senior military officers formulate a strategy 
for innovation.”199 In the case of modularization, there were indications that civilian 
intervention was the main driver of change as Barry Posen suggests will happen when 
war is likely or underway.200 However, because each of three hypothesis was found as 
the most or the second most likely causal factor regarding change in either of the two 
decisions, it is apparent that no one single element was likely responsible to cause the 
Army to change as significantly as it did.  
This thesis was undertaken to investigate Army transformation in regards to the 
force structure changes that resulted in the creation of the SBCT and the modular BCT 
concept, but not to predict the future. However, when looking back at the Army’s 
experience from 1999 through 2005 one indicator for change stands out. That is, the 
importance of the security environment and by extension the Army’s roles and missions 
within it, as a catalyst for change. Therefore, as the security environment changes, and as 
the Army adjusts its roles and missions as operations in Afghanistan likely come to an 
end, it is likely that the force structure changes will occur as well in the not too distant 
future.  
  
                                                 
198 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, 2. 
199 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 21. 
200 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 74–75. 
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